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Abstract
This thesis analyzes how government enforcement contribute to the labor market and
educational behavior in developing countries. The first chapter studies how informality
responds to the quality of the labor enforcement and the bundle of benefits that the
formal workers receive. Countries in Latin America with di↵erent levels of informality were
compared, highlighting the features that could induce these di↵erent levels. In a general
equilibrium framework, the government chooses a level of enforcement and a bundle of
benefits maximizing the workers utility subject to a budget constraint. A representative
firm chooses the share of workers in formality and informality that they want to hire, and
the workers o↵er a share of time in formality and informality. The chapter concludes that
di↵erences in the quality functions of government enforcement and benefits are found, as
well as in the fines established to enforce the agents. The second chapter, co-authored
with Gonzalo Salas, examines how the level of enforcement of the conditionalities of two
Conditional Cash Transfer programs a↵ects the ratios of high school students drop-out.
We develop a structural discrete choice model in which the individuals who are above or
below the participation threshold decide whether or not to attend school, participate in the
labor market, or spend time on home production and/or leisure. The policy experiments
show that if the level of enforcement is higher, individuals change study for leisure and
work, but this last choice has a limit. Moreover, if the amount of transfer is reduced, the
share of those who only study goes down and individuals work more. The third chapter
examines how changes in the social security scheme a↵ect the participation path of workers
between formality and informality. Workers construct their decision paths in the labor
market depending on the retirement program and their endowment of human capital. The
strictness of the requirements lead to more formality but not enough to obtain a pension
for all the educative levels. Finally, the extension of the compulsory active life leads to
more formality and better pensions.
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Chapter 1
Informality and government enforce-
ment in Latin America
1.1 Introduction
Latin America is one of the regions where informality has been identified in depth.
About 50% of salaried workers1 are employed informally, if we define informal workers
as those who are not covered by labor regulation, such as taxation, the right to the
health system and the right to a pension income in retirement (Portes et al. (1989) and
Schneider (2012)). Informal work defines an underdevelopment phase of these economies
and can be better understood as multicausal and complex, and in which the government
can play a crucial role. Although informality is present in each country of the region and
is also present among di↵erent levels of education, as is shown in Table 1.1, the figures are
extremely heterogeneous between di↵erent countries.
The role of the government in informality can be conceived in three main dimensions:
first, the administration receives taxes and contributions from the formal workers; second,
the regulator monitors the firms looking for informal jobs, fines them and eliminates these
jobs; and third, the administration brings benefits to the formal workers through the health
system, pensions and unemployment payments. These three assignments are carried out
to di↵erent degrees and lead to di↵erent levels of enforcement for firms and workers.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on how the labor market responds to
the quality of the government enforcement and the quality of the bundle of
benefits brought by the public institutions. To reach this objective I compare the
informality performance in di↵erent countries, given the quality of the enforcement of the
public sector. I develop a model to capture these relationships and I estimate
it for five countries with di↵erent levels of informality in order to capture the
heterogeneity. These five countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay.
In this paper I will only measure the informality of those who declare that their em-
1Salaried workers are those who have a salary paid by a employer.
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ployer does not pay the necessary contributions in order to give them the right to a pension
in old age. The decision to use this definition is due to the fact that this question is present
in all the household surveys and its consequences have been widely analyzed in the litera-
ture (Holzmann and Takayama (2009), Joubert (2012) and the Chapter 3 of this Thesis).
Levels of informality are clearly heterogenous among countries, not only at all the educa-
tive levels2 but also where other benefits are considered in the definition of informality,
such as health benefits or the 13th salary as is shown in Table 1.2.
Country Mean Low education High education
Argentina 36.1% 39.7% 15.2%
Brazil 21.6% 26.8% 14.3%
Colombia 42.7% 46.9% 14.8%
Peru 51.6% 66.8% 25.2%
Uruguay 19.4% 25.0% 6.5%
Table 1.1: Informality rates among salaried workers in 2009. Source: CEDLAS, World
Bank.
Analyzing the nature of the informality, there are three strands in the literature. The
first one has extensively claimed that there are two separate segmented markets, which
have di↵erent rules, and have been related with low and high productivity sectors. From
the firm point of view, formal and informal workers are treated as two di↵erent inputs. This
concept has been discussed by the empirical literature using data from Mexico, Colombia,
Argentina and Uruguay3, where the evidence suggests that it is the workers who decide
whether to be formal or informal employees. The second strand focuses on the workers’
individual decision to be in each sector given their characteristics as a unique labor mar-
ket. Finally, the third one proposes a moderate dualism, which is considered in most of
the recent theoretical papers. Workers and firms can decide to operate optimally either
formally or informally. Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007) present a model of an economy
with a continuum of firms and workers in which formal and informal jobs and their wages
are endogenous. The main feature which determines formality is the managerial ability
which drives the di↵erence in human capital between these two sectors.
Amaral and Quintin (2006) present a dynamic model where managers can either self-
2High educated workers are defined as those who at least finished high school, and the low educated
the one that did not.
3Magnac (1991), Maloney (2004), Pratap and Quintin (2006) and Bucheli and Ceni (2010)
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finance part of their capital with savings or borrow funds from an intermediary. In this
way, the most talented managers self-select into the formal sector in which formal managers
operate with more physical capital than informal managers and informal employers self-
finance more intensely than the formal ones. The model reproduces the main macro
elements of labor markets in developing nations.
The main controversial point in these models is that the worker’s decision does not
play any role in the equilibrium, which is in contrast to the literature which largely accepts
that it does, especially in the middle and high educated workers. The central argument
against this dualism is the mobility between these sectors, which is clearly observed in these
economies, if workers move between sectors it means that their intrinsic characteristics are
not so di↵erent, then it can be considered as the same input in the production function.
Mobility is a permanent feature of this phenomenon (Fields (2011)). Indeed, there were a
significant number of annual changes among sectors in Argentina between 2003 and 2011
(Table 1.3)
My model introduces a novel general equilibrium framework, where the three main
characters in the economy: households, firms and government optimize the level of infor-
mality, government enforcement and the benefits that formal workers receive. Additionally,
I allow a loose definition of dualism through the definition of the production
function of the representative firm which includes formal and informal work-
ers, where the level of substitution is specifically estimated. In contrast with
the main papers in the literature, which focus on entrepreneurial ability and how it de-
termines in which sector they develop their activity; firms hire both formal and informal
workers contemporaneously, and enter in the production function with di↵erent levels of
substitutability by education. If both inputs are perfect substitutes, the optimal is the
corner solution and inputs can be treated as only one. But, if the level of substitutability
is lower, both inputs coexist in the production function. Theoretically this is one of the
main contributions of this paper.
There are cost and benefits for those either in formality or informality, and these are
borne by employees and employers. Firstly, in formality the employees are obliged to pay
contributions and taxes, but they have the right to receive benefits in the present and in
the future (such as the right to be covered by the health system, enjoy holidays, receive
some extra payments and a pension for the elderly). However, some workers do not value
some of these benefits, because the services which are provided are of poor quality, or the
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Country Pensions Health 13th month Holidays
Argentina 36.1% 35.9% 34.6% 34.4%
Brazil 21.6% - - -
Colombia 42.7% 42.4% 53.7% 28.2%
Peru 51.6% 51.3% - -
Uruguay 19.4% 21.5% 25.3% -
Table 1.2: Informality levels using di↵erent benefits in 2009. Source: CEDLAS.
Probability of yearly change of sector
Unemployment Formal Informal
Unemployment (-1) 0.337 0.254 0.409
Formal (-1) 0.024 0.909 0.067
Informal (-1) 0.086 0.240 0.674
Table 1.3: Probability of change of sector in Argentina, based on the multinomial model
2003-2010. (only men)
government commitment is too weak i.e. they believe that in the future a form of survival
pension will be available for everyone. Additionally, informality is attractive for some
workers because it is a more flexible sector, which allows easier entrance for unemployed
workers or for those who want to acquire experience without signing a formal contract.
The World-Bank (2010) also focused on governmental policies designed to improve
the life quality of the poorest population, such as health insurance or Conditional Cash
Transfer programs. In the case of Colombia, the government has a program to provide
health services to the population below a formal income threshold, so the workers prefer
to be informal because there are no additional (or there are lower) benefits to working
formally.
Secondly, firms in informality do not pay any contributions and taxes because they are
not monitored by the government or the fines are too low. Moreover, there is no social
punishment because this is not viewed as a crime. However, in formality they benefit from
government protection against possible abuse from criminal activities, such as blackmail
(Loayza et al. (2009)).
Finally, the role of government emerges as crucial in both academic and political dis-
cussions about informality. The weakness and corruption of governments play a negative
role in the analysis. Conversely, there is a trade-o↵ about the burden of taxes and reg-
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ulations: on one hand stricter laws can dissuade firms and workers from formality, but,
on the other hand stricter regulation and monitoring should prevent informality (Loayza
et al. (2009)). Moreover, informality plays a role in these economies as a source of flexi-
bility in the cyclical phase of recessions by absorbing the unemployment which could be
generated by the impossibility of paying the cost of the formality. This counter cyclical
behavior leads to governments allowing this practice in order to moderate the impact of
the economic downturn (Loayza and Rigolini (2011)).
Ihrig and Moe (2004) analyze the size of the shadow economies with a two sector model
when the taxes and the enforcement of the taxes change. The main objective of their paper
is to explore the size and the dynamic of the shadow economy cross-country, and when
the enforcement of the taxation changes exogenously. The definition of shadow economies
is more reductive than that of informality because it only focuses on the taxation side of
the problem. Moreover, the government role is exogenous in contrast with my paper when
the government choices are endogenous.
The research question that guide this chapter is: What are the underlying di↵er-
ences (e.g. in enforcement technology, the ability to provide public benefits, the produc-
tion technology, the skill composition of the labor force) that explain jointly the choice
of governments on the level of government enforcement and benefits, and the
reaction of firms and workers in terms of operating in formality/informality?
My aim is to compare the informality performance in di↵erent countries given the quality
of the bundle of benefits, the costs, fines and quality of the government enforcement.
The main objective is to explain the heterogeneity, regarding the fact that this phe-
nomenon is present in all countries in Latin America, and explore the features that
could explain these di↵erences, focusing on costs, benefits and enforcement. I
estimate the main parameters which characterize each country (Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, Peru and Uruguay) in order to assess the di↵erences in the informality levels.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the data and the main
variables of the paper, Section 3 provides the model, with one period and two types of
workers with di↵erent educative levels, Section 4 presents the main results of the estimation
and the experiments, and finally, in Section 5 I present the main conclusions.
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1.2 Data and main variables
I use data from five countries with di↵erent levels of informality: Argentina, Brazil
Colombia, Peru and Uruguay. In order to estimate the production function I use data from
the National Accounts and the household surveys for each one. The data from the National
Accounts is the Gross Value Added for seven sectors (primary, manufacturing industries,
construction, commerce, transport, finance and services).The household surveys have a
socioeconomic purpose and they are crucial in identifying workers in di↵erent productive
sectors in the economy. Identifying the formal workers4 is done directly by asking if the
employer pays the contribution in order to obtain the right for a pension in retirement. The
high educated workers are identified as those who declare that they completed high school
(completed high school and higher), and the low educated all the other ones (uncompleted
high school and lower).
I estimate the informality by education and sector quarterly, and the GDP for each
sector quarterly. In this way the data-base to estimate the production function has 1,162
observations (414 for Argentina, 88 for Brazil, 108 for Colombia, 240 for Peru and 312 for
Uruguay).
For Argentina, I use the Permanent Household Survey (EPH in Spanish) carried out
by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC in Spanish) for the period
1995-2010. The sample is restricted to the urban regions, covering 28 large urban centers
where 70% of the urban population of Argentina live5.
For Brazil, I use the Continuous Household Survey (PNAD)6, conducted by IBGE7
in September of each year between 1996 and 2007. The survey is only carried out in
September, so I only have one observation per year.
In the case of Colombia, I use the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) between 2002
and 2005 and the Large Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) between 2007 and 2010,
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). The question about the social
contribution is only present in the second quarter in the ECH and in the first half of the
4Note that, informal workers are those who are not covered by labor regulation, such as taxation, the
right to the health system and the right to a pension income in retirement.
5Urban population accounts for the 90% for the total population of Argentina, so the survey gives a
good representation of the country.
6Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios.
7Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica.
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year in the GEIH, so the number of observations are limited.
I use the National Household Survey (ENAHO) of Peru carried out by the National
Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) in the period 2001-2010. The sample includes
all urban and rural areas in the country.
In the case of Uruguay, I use the Continuous Household Survey (ECH) conducted by
the National Statistics Institute (INE), between 1997 and 2010 throughout the whole year.
The ECH is a survey carried out in urban areas between 1997 and 2005, where more than
90% of the Uruguayan population is, so the survey gives a good representation of the
country. From 2006 the survey includes rural areas as well.
Finally, to estimate government enforcement and the quality of the benefits that the
formal workers receive, I use some indicators collected by the InterAmerican Development
Bank. In particular for the quality of government enforcement I use two indicators: com-
pliance with the law8 and confidence in the judiciary system9. For the benefits that the
government provides, I use the citizens’ perception of the taxes being well spent10.
In this framework, the literature basically assigns three roles to the government: col-
lecting taxes, providing benefits and monitoring and regulating the economy. Empirical
analysis shows an ambiguous relation between the uno cial economy and the level of
taxation, and a positive relation with corruption using a large cross-country data-base of
entrepreneurs. Johnson et al. (1998), using simple OLS regression, find a positive relation
between regulation bureaucracy, tax burden and corruption with higher uno cial activ-
ities. Friedman et al. (2000) go further with a larger number of countries and find that
the taxes have a negative e↵ect on the uno cial economy, and it is the corruption and the
bureaucracy which have a positive e↵ect.
First, in Figure 1.1 we can observe the relationship between informality and the social
contributions (taxes) of both employee and employer. There is a slightly negative relation
between them, i.e. countries with a high level of contribution have less informality. This
relation is observed both with the total, employer and employee contribution, and it could
be interpreted as a part of the institutional framework.
8This indicator represents the percentage of those surveyed who respond that they believe that citizens
comply with the law very much or a fair amount. Source: Latinobarometer.
9It measures the percentage of firms that agree with the statement: I am confident that the judicial
system will enforce my contractual and property rights in business disputes. Source: World Bank.
10This indicator represents the percentage of answers to the question: Do you believe that the government
spends your tax dollars well?
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Figure 1.1: Informality by social contribution in Latin America
(a) Employer and employee contribution
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Second, I explore the relation between informality and the quality of the benefits. In
Figure 1.2 we can establish that there is a clear negative relation between the perception
that taxes are well spent by the government and informality.
Figure 1.2: Informality by benefits in Latin America
(a) Taxes well spent
Finally, I consider the relation between informality and government enforcement, mea-
sured by citizen compliance with the law (Figure 1.3). There is a clear negative relation
between them, which is in line with the literature on the relation between informality and
institutions.
These three figures show that two of the three relations between government role and
informality appear clearly in the cross-country data. The benefits that the workers receive
and the level of government enforcement in the labor market seem to play an important
role in the level of informality, and in the process of formalization.
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Figure 1.3: Informality by government enforcement in Latin America
(a) Compliance with the law
1.3 Model
I develop a simple model to analyze the relation between the levels of informality by
education
 
✓iL, ✓
i
H
 
and the quality of government enforcement
 
q(e)
 
and the quality of
benefits
 
K ()
 
. The households and firms decide on the level of informality (formality),
and simultaneously there is a government choosing the level of enforcement in the labor
market, and the benefits that the formal workers would enjoy.
1.3.1 Optimization problem: households and firms
Representative household problem: In a representative household, there are a
continuous of x workers with a low level of education (s = L) , and 1   x with a high
level (s = H). This household maximizes its consumption deciding the share of informal
(✓is) and formal (✓
f
s ) work for each level of education s. There is no utility of leisure, the
worker decides how to split their total number of hours (x and 1   x) between formality
and informality. The consumption is determined by the revenues from formal and informal
work, a lump sum tax (T ) and the profit from firms (⇧) which is fixed at zero. The formal
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revenues are the wage of formal hours !fs ✓
f
s and they also receive
 
K ()
 
representing
the quality of the benefits that the formal workers enjoy. The informal revenues are the
informal wage !is✓
i
s for the hours worked in informality, and there is also a share ( 2q(e))
of this total wage which is lost. This loss depend on the quality of the enforcement (q(e))
and a parameter  2, and represents a market imperfection in the informal labor market.
max
C,{✓is,✓fs }
U
 
C
 
(1.1)
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X
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s
⇣
1   2q(e)
⌘
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f
s
⇣
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⌘#
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The maximum of low skill hours is x:
✓iL + ✓
f
L  x (1.3)
and the maximum of high skill hours is 1  x:
✓iH + ✓
f
H  1  x (1.4)
Lagrangian function:
L = U
 
C
 
+  HH1
"
C  
X
s
"
!is✓
i
s
⇣
1   2q(e)
⌘
  !fs ✓fs
⇣
1 +K ()
⌘#
+ T  ⇧
#
+ HH2
 
✓iL + ✓
f
L   x
!
+  HH3
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H   (1  x)
! (1.5)
The interior solution to the household problem (✓js 6= 0) implies workers o↵ering for-
mal and informal hours in the labor market, then wages in informality after the market
imperfection loss is equal to the formal wage plus the benefits:
✓iL
@L
@✓iL
= 0 : ✓iL
✓
   HH1
✓
!iL
⇣
1   2q(e)
⌘◆
+  HH2
◆
= 0 (1.6)
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Representative firm problem: A representative firm, decides to hire a share of
informal lis and formal workers l
f
s for each educative level s. The firm pays the formal
workers !fs l
f
s plus taxes ⌧ , I am considering that the net wage (after taxes) and the taxes
are only paid by the firm. Informal workers receive !isl
i
s but the firm faces a proportional
fine  1q(e) if that job is monitored.
max
lis,l
f
s
⇧ = y
 
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f
s
  X
s
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1 +  1q(e)
 
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i
s + !
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(1.10)
F.O.C.
lis :
@y(lis, l
f
s )
@lis
 
✓
!is
 
1 +  1q(e)
 ◆
= 0 (1.11)
lfs :
@y(lis, l
f
s )
@lfs
 
✓
!fs (1 + ⌧)
◆
= 0 (1.12)
The market clearing condition equalizes the share of hours in formality and informality
for each level of education, that the firm demands and the worker supplies:
lis = ✓
i
s ; l
f
s = ✓
f
s (1.13)
The definition of the production function is one of the contributions of this paper.
In the literature most of the papers either introduce the formality and informality as
substitutes as in Ihrig and Moe (2004), or treat them as complements modeled in a Cobb-
Douglass framework. The functional form which I choose is the CES function as in Dolado
et al. (2001), Giuliodori and Stucchi (2010), Cappellari et al. (2011) who model the coex-
istence of temporary and permanent workers to reflect the fact that there are two types of
workers who are not di↵erent in essence but contractually. In the informality literature,
Ulyssea (2010) also presents a model with a CES production function with formal and
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informal intermediate goods. The CES function allows me to introduce the loose form of
market duality, if formal and informal are perfect substitutes the solution tends to be a
corner solution. However, if there is an imperfect substitution, formality and informality
coexist in the production function.
Remark 1 The CES production function of the representative firm including contempo-
raneously formal and informal workers captures the market duality through the level of
substitutability  j. If inputs have high substitutability, it shows that both inputs are more
similar than in the case when the parameter goes to the complementarity. The production
function is:
• y =  l⇢1H l⇢2L
• lH =

 1(l
f
H)
  1 + (1   1)(liH)  1
  ( 1)
 1
lL =

 2(l
f
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  2 + (1   2)(liL)  2
  ( 2)
 2
The level of substitutability is determined by  j , if it is close to -1, both inputs are
perfect substitutes. Conversely if both inputs are complements,  j !1.
From the F.O.C. of the firm problem
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1.3.2 Equilibrium: households and firms
I will focus only on the interior solution (✓j⇤s 6= 0) firms where both formal and informal
workers coexist. The relative informal wages depend positively on the quality of benefits
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and the quality of government enforcement:
!i⇤L
!f⇤L
=
 
1 +K ()
  
1   2q(e)
 
!i⇤H
!f⇤H
=
 
1 +K ()
  
1   2q(e)
  (1.14)
The relative size of the informal sector depends on the relative wage, the relation
between fines from being in informality
 
 1q(e)
 
, and the contribution paid by the formal
employer (⌧), while the di↵erences in educative levels is given by the formal shares ( 1
and  2) and the level of substitutability ( 1 and  2) of the production function.
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The share of informality in both educative levels in equilibrium depend negatively on
the level of enforcement e (Equations 1.16) and the benefits  (Equations 1.17 ).
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1.3.3 Optimization problem: Government
The government maximizes the consumer’s utility by choosing benefits  and the level
of enforcement e as a carrot and a stick. For those workers in formality there is a carrot
which is benefits K (), and there is a stick for those in informality which is the quality of
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government enforcement (q(e)) and the level of fines  1.
The government equalizes the resources (from the social contribution in the formal
jobs ⌧ , the fines in the informal jobs  1q(e) and a lump sum tax (T ) with the spending
e.g. the cost of the government enforcement and providing benefits which is given by the
function B(e,) (Equation 1.20)
Remark 2 This maximization allows the government to choose the level of enforcement
and benefits such that informality can exist in the labor market in its optimal choices. This
possibility goes in the direction that some level of informality can be allowed by the gov-
ernment through the relaxation of the quality of the government enforcement and benefits.
This point could be controversial if informality is perceived as a purely negative feature in
the economy, although in this paper I use an agonistical approach to informality.
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1.3.4 Equilibrium: Government
The functional forms which are chosen to estimate this model are such that the quality
functions (enforcement e, and benefits ) are increasing and concave where a and d are
the quality parameters. The cost function of government enforcement and benefits are
25
Chapter 1. Informality and government enforcement in Latin America
quadratic
q(e) = a
p
e K () = d
p

B(e,) = b1e
2 + b2
2 + b3
(1.23)
The equilibrium enforcement and benefits are:
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The level of enforcement e depends positively on the mass of salaries in the informality
(!iL✓
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H), the ratio of the quality and cost function parameters
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, and the term
 1    2, which is the di↵erence between the fines which the firms pay for any informal
job monitored and the worker loss in the informality. If the fines were equal to the
workers’ losses, the level of government enforcement would be zero because the e↵ect
of the informality is solved within the market, and the action of the government is not
necessary.
The level of benefits  that the government chooses depends positively on the mass of
salaries in the formality (!fL✓
f
L + !
f
H✓
f
H), and the ratio of the quality and cost function
parameters db2 .
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The level of taxes is given by the equalized budget constraint of the government:
T ⇤ =
X
s
B(e⇤,⇤)  ⌧!f⇤s ✓f⇤s    1!i⇤s ✓i⇤s q(e⇤)
Definition 1 Given the set of parameters, there is a unique equilibrium which determines
the level of informality in each level of education (✓i⇤s ) working, the level of government
enforcement over informal jobs (e⇤), the benefits that the government brings to the formal
ones (⇤), and the lump sum taxes collected from the households (T ⇤).
In this section, I analyze what the e↵ect is of the exogenous parameters in the main
model equilibrium outcomes (✓is, e and ). I focus not only on the comparative statics
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with respect to single parameters11, but also considering the e↵ect of a couple of them12.
In the Equations in 1.24, I analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium relative
size of the informality (✓i⇤s ) in respect to the fines ( 1) and informal market imperfection
or informal wage loss ( 2). These shares depend negatively on the fines that the firm has
to pay if the informal job is monitored ( 1) and it is uncertain on the share of informal
wage that the worker loses if their job is monitored ( 2). Figure C.1 shows the simulated
performance of a grid of  1 and  2, the informality is more sensitive with a change of  1
than  2.
Additionally, I consider the comparative statics of the informality shares respect to the
quality function parameters. These shares decrease when the parameters of the quality
of monitoring and benefits function (a and d) increase. The e↵ect of a on the informality
is higher than the e↵ect of d, as is shown in Figure C.3. Figures C.4 and C.5, show the
e↵ect of the quality and cost parameters of the enforcement and the benefits, negative in
quality and positive in costs.
✓i⇤s
@ 1
< 0
✓i⇤s
@ 2
n.d.
✓i⇤s
@a
< 0
✓i⇤s
@d
< 0
(1.24)
The comparative statics in the Equations in 1.25 show that government enforcement
e⇤ is decreasing in the fines parameters ( 1), decreasing in the quality of benefits (d) and
unknown sign respect to the quality of government enforcement (a). The equilibrium
behavior when these parameters change is also shown in Figures C.3 and C.4, in which
the equilibrium is solved by fixing the other parameters. The e↵ect of a on e⇤ is positive
with this set of parameters, which was uncertain in the analytical analysis, and the e↵ect
of b1 is negative (but the intensity also depend on the level of a as is shown in Figure C.4).
@e⇤
@ 1
< 0
@e⇤
@a
n.d.
@e⇤
@d
< 0 (1.25)
11The analytical development is presented in Appendix C.
12The graphical analysis is presented in Appendix C, where there is a numerical exercise fixing the
parameters as Argentina, and then computing the solution on a grid of two parameters. The parameters
for Argentina are shown in Table 1.6.
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@⇤
@ 1
> 0
@⇤
@a
> 0
@⇤
@d
> 0 (1.26)
The benefits  increases in fines ( 1), the quality parameter of the enforcement (a)
and the benefits (d), as is shown in Figure C.4. Figures C.3 and C.5, show the e↵ect on
 of d and b2, which are positive and negative respectively.
In the set of Equations in 1.27 and 1.28 I present the e↵ect of the production function
parameters on the model outcomes. In the case of the level of substitutability, the signs
depend on the terms B1 or B2. If these terms are higher than one, a higher level of
substitutability ( j !  1) leads to a lower level of informality, but if B1 or B2 are between
0 and 1, higher substitutability ( j !  1) leads to higher informality.
✓i⇤L
@ 2
> 0
e⇤
@ 2
> 0
⇤
@ 2
< 0
if B2 =
"
 2
1   2
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1 +  1q(e)
1 + ⌧
#
> 1
✓i⇤L
@ 2
< 0
e⇤
@ 2
< 0
⇤
@ 2
> 0 if 0 < B2 < 1
(1.27)
✓i⇤H
@ 1
> 0
e⇤
@ 1
> 0
⇤
@ 1
< 0
if B1 =
"
 1
1   1
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1 +  1q(e)
1 + ⌧
#
> 1
✓i⇤H
@ 1
< 0
e⇤
@ 1
< 0
⇤
@ 1
> 0 if 0 < B1 < 1
(1.28)
In the first two panels of Figure C.2, I observe how the share of informality changes
with the level of substitutability between formal and informal workers in the case of the
educated workers and the non educated ones ( 1 and  2) and the shares in the production
function ( 1 and  2). If these shares were lower, Bj is lower than 1, then the sign of the
comparative statics of the informality would be the opposite.
1.4 Results
The empirical strategy is to estimate both the production function and the quality and
the cost functions. However, Botero Garc´ıa (2010) calibrates the elasticity of substitution
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of a CES production function with informal and formal workers, the level of substitutability
for low educated worker is -0.5, and between educated and non educated workers it is
3.3. Ulyssea (2010) also calibrates the parameters of the general level of substitutability
between formal and informal production at -0.3. My empirical strategy is to estimate
the parameters of the production function from the data. The production function is
estimated by an approximation of a linear regression. The other parameters of the model
are estimated with the Method of Moments.
In order to estimate the CES production function (and the nested production function)
I use the linear Taylor-series approximation, which was first developed by Kmenta (1967).
y =  
⇥
 1x
 ↵
1 + (1   1)x ↵2
⇤  
↵
The second order Taylor Approximation at ⇢ = 013
y =  x  11 x
 (1  1)
2 exp( 0.5↵  1(1   1)(lnx1   lnx2)2)
In the case of my paper the production function is defined as follows, y =  l⇢1H l
⇢2
L ,
lH =

 1(l
f
H)
  1 + (1   1)(liH)  1
  ( 1)
 1
and
lL =

 2(l
f
L)
  2 + (1    2)(liL)  2
  ( 2)
 2
, using the same methodology to estimate it we
obtain that:
ln y ⇡ ln   + ⇢1 1 1 ln lfH + ⇢1 1(1   1) ln liH  
1
2
⇢1 1 1(1   1) 1(ln lfH   ln liH)2
+ ⇢2 2 2 ln l
f
L + ⇢2 2(1   2) ln liL  
1
2
⇢2 2 2(1   2) 2(ln lfL   ln liL)2
To estimate:
ln y =  0+ 1 ln l
f
H + 2 ln l
i
H + 3(ln l
f
H   ln liH)2+ 4 ln lfL+ 5 ln liL+ 6(ln lfL  ln liL)2+ ✏
13Kmenta (1967) justifies this only by mathematical convenience and in order to estimate around the
Cobb Douglass shape.
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The main parameters of the production function are estimated:
 1 =
 1
 1 +  2
 1 =
 2 3
 2 1
 2 =
 4
 4 +  5
 2 =
 2 6
 5 2
OLS IV(1) IV(2)
ln lfH 2.608*** 3.227*** 3.687***
(0.57) (0.55) (0.57)
ln liH 2.641*** 3.493*** 3.875***
(0.47) (0.42) (0.51)
ln lfL 2.031*** 2.180*** 1.649***
(0.44) (0.45) (0.39)
ln liL 2.189*** 2.312*** 2.267***
(0.46) (0.48) (0.42)
(ln lfH   ln liH)2 0.346*** 0.472*** 0.615***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
(ln lfL   ln liL)2 0.329*** 0.375*** 0.354***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Constant 16.97*** 17.67*** 17.25***
(0.79) (0.71) (0.77)
Year yes yes yes
Sector yes yes yes
R2 0.573 0.689 0.667
N 987 807 865
 1 0.497 0.48 0.488
 1 -0.528 -0.563 -0.651
 2 0.481 0.485 0.421
 2 -0.624 -0.669 -0.741
⇢1 1 5.25 6.72 7.56
⇢2 2 4.22 4.49 3.92
Table 1.4: Estimation of the production function
The results of the production function estimation appear in Table 1.4, the dependent
variable is the logarithm of the aggregate value by sector14 and the independent variables
14The seven sector that I consider are: primary, manufacturing industries, construction, commerce,
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are the logarithm of the informality shares. In Table 1.4, I estimate the parameters for
all the countries together. The level of substitutability ( 0s) is slightly higher in the case
of the non educated workers, but even for the educated it is relatively high. The shares
of workers are lower than 0.5, so the terms B1 and B2 are closer to 1, if these terms are
lower than 1, the informality is decreasing with respect to  1 and  2.
The second and third columns present the IV estimation instrumented by the lags. In
the second column, the estimation is through the inclusion of the error term of the first
steps. Note that the joint test of these error terms is significative15. In the third column,
the estimation is instrumented by the predicted estimation from the first step. In the next
section, I will use the estimation from the second column.
In the estimation of the model’s parameters through the Methods of Moments, min-
imizing the distance between the moments from the model and the data, I match the
quality of government enforcement q(e), the quality of the benefits that the formal work-
ers receive from the government K (), the level of informality in both levels of education,
the level of lump sum taxes, and the share of public expenditure.
As is discussed in the introduction there are no clear variables to match in the case of
the quality functions, so I want to compare how the fit is in the di↵erent countries16. In
the case of the quality of government enforcement I match the indicator with compliance
with the law, and the quality of the benefits is matched with the indicator taxes well
spent. Informality shares are estimated with the National Household Surveys, the public
expenditures are matched with the figure from the National Accounts, and the level of the
lump sum tax is matched at zero17.
Firstly, I present the result of the estimation for each country independently. The
model fits the data quite well in general and in particular the ranking of the countries is
respected, as is presented in Table 1.5. This latter point is somewhat important given the
comparative objective of this paper, principally, if the comparison is between the countries
with better performance, such as Brazil and Uruguay, with those with low performance as
in the case of Peru. However, there are some features that I want to highlight: informality
transport, finance and services.
15F(4, 775) = 9.41 Prob > F = 0.00.
16The variables to fit are taken by surveys which are published for the the IADB.
17The wages are not considered as moments because there is no data about work hours in Colombia,
and there is a lack of information to construct (comparatively) the formal wages including benefits for all
the countries.
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for the low educated workers is underestimated, and probably the main problem is the
overestimation in the high educated ones. The quality of government enforcement and
quality of benefits are well estimated with the exception of the government enforcement
in Brazil. The share of public expenditure is well estimated, and the taxes, which is a
residual variable, fit well at zero.
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.2616 0.338 0.2193 0.228 0.2343 0.349 0.4134 0.485 0.2266 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.1244 0.079 0.0668 0.026 0.1151 0.057 0.1740 0.117 0.0849 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.2002 0.232 0.2907 0.431 0.3165 0.317 0.1574 0.162 0.5080 0.508
K (⇤) 0.1884 0.209 0.1458 0.161 0.1602 0.167 0.0922 0.101 0.3575 0.358
T 0.0001 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 0.0003 0.000 0.0001 0.000
SCP 0.1770 0.162 0.2018 0.246 0.1708 0.213 0.1237 0.110 0.1505 0.151
Table 1.5: Moment matching with the country by country estimation.
In Table 1.6 the estimation of the parameters for all five countries can be observed.
Given that the e↵ect of the quality parameters and the enforcement go in the same direc-
tion, it is not possible to observe a clear ranking in them. However, comparing a group of
parameters as the term
 a( 1  2)
4b1
 
(which multiply government enforcement e) is higher in
countries with a lower level of informality, especially when the extreme countries (Uruguay
or Brazil and Peru) are compared. Considering the countries with a low level of informal-
ity, the parameters of Uruguay and Brazil are 6.5 and 5.3 respectively and the Peruvian
is 3.3. The order when the parameters that multiply the level of benefits are considered
( d4b2 ) is not so clear. Again, the parameters of Peru is the lowest one (1.08), while the
parameters are quite similar for Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay (2.45, 2.14 and 2.22
respectively).
In order to disentangle how each parameter can di↵erentiate the optimal level of the
quality functions and the level of the informality for these five countries, I will estimate the
parameters for all countries together, leaving only one parameter being di↵erent country
by country. Tables A.1 - A.5 show the moment matching when the fines  1, the market
imperfection  2, quality of the government enforcement a, the quality of the benefits
d, and the cost parameters b1 and b2 are di↵erent country by country using the levels
of informality, the quality of enforcement and benefits, the lump sum tax and public
expenditure as moments. Obviously, the model fits worse than when the countries all
have di↵erent parameters.
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Argentina Brazil Colombia Peru Uruguay
a 0.8951 0.9180 1.5336 0.6329 1.9675
(0 .000 ) (0 .096 ) (0 .000 ) (0 .002 ) (0 .002 )
d 0.8426 0.6521 0.8087 0.6247 1.6775
(0 .000 ) (0 .001 ) (0 .001 ) (0 .037 ) (0 .007 )
b1 0.0944 0.0645 0.1138 0.0001 0.0209
(0 .186 ) (0 .050 ) (0 .001 ) (0 .002 ) (0 .001 )
b2 0.0861 0.1159 0.0943 0.1442 0.1888
(0 .053 ) (0 .311 ) (0 .000 ) (0 .027 ) (0 .001 )
b3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
 1 1.1710 1.6423 1.2326 0.1319 0.3776
(0 .327 ) (0 .131 ) (0 .065 ) (0 .005 ) (0 .142 )
 2 0.1878 0.1547 0.0000 0.1298 0.1016
(0 .192 ) (0 .004 ) (0 .000 ) (0 .127 ) (0 .002 )
Table 1.6: Estimation of all quality and cost parameters with the production function’s
parameters  1 =  0.563 ,  2 =  0.669 ,  1 = 0.480,  2 = 0.485, ⇢1 1 = 6.72 and
⇢2 2 = 4.92. The standard deviations are estimated by the gradient of the moments
vector.
Table A.1 shows the model matching when the fines  1 are di↵erent country by country,
the high informality is the moment which has most problems to fit with a clear overesti-
mation (about double of the data). Regarding the fit with the other moments, there is no
clear tendency (neither underestimation nor overestimation for all countries).
Table A.2 shows the moment matching when the market imperfection  2 is di↵erent
country by country, the high informality is again overestimated, and the low informality
is well estimated for those countries with low levels (Brazil and Uruguay) but there is an
underestimation for the other ones.
In the left panel of Table 1.7, I observe the performance of  1, which is the amount
of fines that the firm would have to pay to have workers in informality, leaving the other
parameters constant country by country. There is a clear and direct relation between the
level of fines and level of informality, in particular it is higher in Brazil and Uruguay, 1.4
and 0.88, than in Argentina and Peru, 0.2 and 0.025 respectively. In the case of Colombia,
it has a relatively high level of fines that is reflected in lower levels of informality in low
educated workers (see Table A.1). The ability of  1 to capture heterogeneity in the model
is a feature which is is line with the empirical evidence of the literature.
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Parameters Value Std. Dev. Parameters Value Std. Dev.
a 1.1045 (0 .031 ) a 0.2581 (0 .008 )
d 0.6185 (0 .123 ) d 0.3625 (0 .124 )
b1 0.0109 (0 .0001 ) b1 0.0000 (0 .000 )
b2 0.0297 (0 .005 ) b2 0.0070 (0 .001 )
b3 0.001 ( ) b3 0.001 ( )
 a1 0.2012 (0 .008 )  1 0.8716 (0 .037 )
 b1 1.3991 (0 .027 )  
a
2 0.8528 (0 .041 )
 c1 0.9332 (0 .017 )  
b
2 0.1104 (0 .293 )
 p1 0.0250 (0 .001 )  
c
2 0.0122 (0 .003 )
 u1 0.8836 (0 .020 )  
p
2 0.8546 (0 .035 )
 2 0.0000 (0 .0004 )  u2 0.1421 (0 .297 )
Table 1.7: Estimation of fines ( 1) and market imperfection ( 2) parameters with the
production function’s parameters  1 =  0.563 ,  2 =  0.669 ,  1 = 0.480,  2 = 0.485,
⇢1 1 = 6.72 and ⇢2 2 = 4.92. The standard deviations are estimated by the gradient of
the moments vector.
In the right panel of Table 1.7, there is the parameter estimation when  2 (market
imperfection) is di↵erent country by country. Countries with high levels of informality,
such as Argentina and Peru present high values of  2 and Brazil and Uruguay have lower
values. In this case, Colombia is again the country in which the order does not fit, and it
is reflected in the underestimation in the informality of low educated workers (see Table
A.2). The market imperfection parameter is not able to capture the heterogeneity as the
fines parameter was able to.
In Table 1.8, I present the estimation when the parameters of the quality functions
change. The moment matching of these estimation are presented in Tables A.3 and A.4.
The matching which corresponds to the a estimation (Table A.3) shows the overestimation
of the high educated informality and the underestimation of the low educated informality
for Brazil and Uruguay, but a good fit for the other countries. The matching of d estimation
(Table A.4) is similar to the previous one. Both quality parameters allow the model to
capture the heterogeneity in the moments.
The left panel of Table 1.8 shows the estimation of the quality of government enforce-
ment, and the right panel the quality of the benefits. The estimations of the quality
parameters show the same order as the informality and not the order of the quality mo-
ments among countries. These estimations show that better quality parameters means
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Parameters Value Std. Dev. Parameters Value Std. Dev.
aa 0.3226 (0 .030 ) a 0.3280 (0 .088 )
ab 0.7757 (0 .242 ) da 0.2866 (0 .003 )
ac 0.2688 (0 .010 ) db 0.3640 (0 .004 )
ap 0.0581 (0 .093 ) dc 0.1418 (0 .001 )
au 0.8792 (0 .039 ) dp 0.0220 (0 .0003 )
d 0.6679 (0 .019 ) du 0.5059 (0 .01 )
b1 0.0012 (0 .00002 ) b1 0.0002 (0 .00001 )
b2 0.0449 (0 .0002 b2 0.0007 (0 .00001 )
b3 0.001 ( ) b3 0.001 ( )
 1 1.132 (0 .065 )  1 0.6368 (0 .015 )
 2 0.0152 (0 .007 )  2 0.0898 (0 .0061 )
Table 1.8: Estimation of quality function parameters with the production function’s pa-
rameters  1 =  0.563 ,  2 =  0.669 ,  1 = 0.480,  2 = 0.485, ⇢1 1 = 6.72 and ⇢2 2 = 4.92.
The standard deviations are estimated by the gradient of the moments vector.
lower informality.
Table 1.9 shows the estimation of the cost function, and Table A.5 is the moment
matching of this estimation. The cost function is able to reproduce the heterogeneity, the
model matches the order well but it has some problems in the case of Argentina. Lower
cost function parameters lead to low levels of informality.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
I consider informality using a loose form of dualism and it is formalized through the
definition of the production function. This is one of the main contributions of this paper.
The model captures the quality of government enforcement and benefits, and the in-
formality for two levels of education in five di↵erent Latin American countries which have
a great heterogeneity among them.
The first result is the estimation of a production function where formal and informal
workers coexist when there are two levels of education. I estimate the production function
using data from all countries, and the level of substitutability of the low educated workers
is higher than the level of the high educated workers.
The second result is the estimation of the parameters in the quality of government
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Parameters Value Std Dev
a 0.8707 (0 .019 )
d 0.8911 (0 .049 )
ba1 0.0023 (0 .002 )
ba2 0.1286 (0 .017 )
bb1 0.0019 (0 .001 )
bb2 0.0192 (0 .000 )
bc1 0.3458 (0 .080 )
bc2 0.4641 (0 .212 )
bp1 1.7367 (0 .167 )
bp2 0.1863 (0 .028 )
bu1 0.0000 (0 .000 )
bu2 0.0087 (0 .000 )
b3 0.001 ( )
 1 1.2232 (0 .192 )
 2 0.0002 (0 .006 )
Table 1.9: Estimation of cost function parameters with the production function’s param-
eters  1 =  0.563 ,  2 =  0.669 ,  1 = 0.480,  2 = 0.485, ⇢1 1 = 6.72 and ⇢2 2 = 4.92.
The standard deviations are estimated by the gradient of the moments vector.
enforcement, the quality of the benefits that the workers receive in formal employment,
the fines, the market imperfection and the cost function by the Method of Moments.
Through this estimation, the model can capture the ranking of countries as well as the
informality for di↵erent educative levels. However, the model has some di culties in
capturing the level of informality for high educative levels.
The third result is the estimation leaving one parameter free, only the market imper-
fection parameter  2 does not allow the model to reproduce the heterogeneity. The fines
( 1), quality parameters (a and d) and cost parameters (b1 and b2) allow the model to
generate heterogeneity, and the moments are matched quite well.
In short, the model captures the main features of these economies and produces a good
estimation of the parameters describing the countries’ heterogeneity.
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1.6 Appendix: Tables and figures.
The Tables A.1 - A.4 show the model matching when the estimation is made leaving
only one parameter ( 1,  2, a, d, b1 and b2) di↵erent among countries.
Table A.1: Moment matching leaving free the fine parameter  1.
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.3731 0.338 0.1817 0.228 0.2363 0.349 0.4040 0.485 0.2436 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.1609 0.079 0.0964 0.026 0.1158 0.057 0.1710 0.117 0.1182 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.3075 0.232 0.4041 0.431 0.4069 0.317 0.1589 0.162 0.4061 0.508
K (⇤) 0.1582 0.209 0.1613 0.161 0.1639 0.167 0.1546 0.101 0.1641 0.358
T 0.0003 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 0.0005 0.000 -0.0002 0.000
SCP 0.1338 0.162 0.1948 0.246 0.1718 0.213 0.1267 0.110 0.1692 0.151
Table A.2: Moment matching leaving the market imperfection  2 free .
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.2784 0.338 0.2214 0.228 0.2599 0.349 0.2822 0.485 0.2176 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.1300 0.079 0.1106 0.026 0.1238 0.057 0.1312 0.117 0.1092 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.1532 0.232 0.4521 0.431 0.3964 0.317 0.1488 0.162 0.4436 0.508
K (⇤) 0.1305 0.209 0.1302 0.161 0.1310 0.167 0.1305 0.101 0.1301 0.358
T -0.0000 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0004 0.000 -0.0000 0.000 -0.0002 0.000
SCP 0.1419 0.162 0.1737 0.246 0.1505 0.213 0.1410 0.110 0.1741 0.151
Table A.3: Moment matching leaving the quality of the government enforcement parameter
a free.
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.2983 0.338 0.1842 0.228 0.3173 0.349 0.3946 0.485 0.1674 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.1366 0.079 0.0973 0.026 0.1428 0.057 0.1679 0.117 0.0910 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.1952 0.232 0.4871 0.431 0.1578 0.317 0.0227 0.162 0.5467 0.508
K (⇤) 0.1578 0.209 0.1559 0.161 0.1570 0.167 0.1504 0.101 0.1545 0.358
T -0.0001 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0000 0.000 0.0004 0.000 -0.0001 0.000
SCP 0.1524 0.162 0.1931 0.246 0.1474 0.213 0.1291 0.110 0.2020 0.151
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Table A.4: Moment matching leaving the quality of the benefits d free.
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.2759 0.338 0.2481 0.228 0.3284 0.349 0.3630 0.485 0.2021 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.1291 0.079 0.1198 0.026 0.1464 0.057 0.1577 0.117 0.1038 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.3032 0.232 0.2926 0.431 0.3195 0.317 0.3278 0.162 0.2721 0.508
K (⇤) 0.2079 0.209 0.2861 0.161 0.0803 0.167 0.0066 0.101 0.4398 0.358
T -0.0000 0.000 0.0001 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 0.0004 0.000
SCP 0.1544 0.162 0.1621 0.246 0.1444 0.213 0.1408 0.110 0.1789 0.151
Table A.5: Moment matching leaving the cost function b1 and b2 free.
Argentina Brasil Colombia Peru Uruguay
Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data
✓i⇤L 0.1795 0.338 0.1420 0.228 0.3553 0.349 0.3670 0.485 0.1140 0.240
✓i⇤H 0.0956 0.079 0.0812 0.026 0.1552 0.057 0.1590 0.117 0.0699 0.024
q(e⇤) 0.4694 0.232 0.4572 0.431 0.1243 0.317 0.0745 0.162 0.4933 0.508
K (⇤) 0.1609 0.209 0.2961 0.161 0.1041 0.167 0.1402 0.101 0.3766 0.358
T -0.0002 0.000 0.0001 0.000 -0.0000 0.000 0.0002 0.000 0.0001 0.000
SCP 0.1959 0.162 0.2162 0.246 0.1411 0.213 0.1363 0.110 0.2152 0.151
1.7 Appendix: Household problem
The complete F.O.C. of the Representative household problem are:
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1.8 Appendix: Comparative Statics of the equilibrium vari-
ables
In this section I show the comparative statics of the informality shares, the level of gov-
ernment enforcement and the benefits (✓iL, ✓
i
H , e and ) and the main exogenous variables
( 1,  2,  j ,  j , a and d).
Some terms for j = {1, 2}:
Aj =
1
 j + 1
"
 j
1   j
1 +K()
1   2q(e)
1 +  1q(e)
1 + ⌧
#   j+2 j+1  j
1   j
1
(1   2q(e))(1 + ⌧) > 0
E1 =
 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
  
 1    2
 @2q
@e2
  @
2B
@e2
< 0
K1 =
 
!fL(x  ✓iL) + !fH(1  x  ✓iH)
 @2K
@2
  @
2B
@2
< 0
Bj =
"
 j
1   j
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1 +  1q(e)
1 + ⌧
#
> 0
Cj =
1
 j + 1
"
 j
1   j
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1 +  1q(e)
1 + ⌧
#   j+2 j+1 1 +K ()
(1   2q(e))
1 +  1q(e)
(1 + ⌧)
> 0
j = {1, 2}
Denominator D :
D =
  0z }| {
x 
x  ✓iL
 2
"
1  x 
1  x  ✓iH
 2
#
E1K1+
"
A1x 
x  ✓iL
 2 + A2(1  x) 
1  x  ✓iH
 2
#
⇤"  
!fL + !
f
H
  
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K
@
i2
E1| {z }
 0
  !iL + !iH 
 
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
! 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
K1| {z }
  0
#
(C.1)
In the interval of interest of the parameters the simulation shows that the positive terms
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are higher than the negative one, then:
D > 0
1.8.1 Comparative statics of ✓i⇤L and ✓
i⇤
H
In this section I show the comparative statics of ✓iL and ✓
i
H with respect to the main
exogenous parameters of the model. The change of ✓iL and ✓
i
H with respect to  1 is
negative, the amount of fines impact negatively on the equilibrium informal shares:
Numerator N11:
@✓iL
@ 1
=
N11
D
< 0 (C.2)
N11 = A2
⇣
1 +K ()
⌘ 1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
K1
"
( 1 +  2)
1   2q(e)
 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
 h@q
@e
i2   q(e)E1# < 0
(C.3)
Numerator N21:
@✓iH
@ 1
=
N21
D
< 0 (C.4)
N21 = A1
⇣
1+K ()
⌘ x
(x  ✓iL)2
K1
"  
 1 +  2
 
1   2q(e)
 
!iL✓
i
L+!
i
H✓
i
H
 h@q
@e
i2 q(e)E1# < 0 (C.5)
The impact is higher in the lower (higher) skilled informal worker if:
@✓iL
@ 1
  @✓
i
H
@ 1
i↵
A2(1  x) 
1  x  ✓iH
 2   A1x 
x  ✓iL
 2
In the case of the comparative statics of ✓iL and ✓
i
H respect to  2 the sign is uncertain.
Numerator N12:
@✓iL
@ 2
=
N12
D
n.d. (C.6)
N12 =  A2 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
K1
" 
1+ 1q(e)
 
q(e)E1+( 1+ 2)
 
!iL✓
i
L+!
i
H✓
i
H
 h@q
@e
i2#
n.d.
(C.7)
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Numerator N22:
@✓iH
@ 2
=
N22
D
n.d. (C.8)
N22 =  A1 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
x
(x  ✓iL)2
K1
"⇣
1+ 1q(e)
⌘
q(e)E1+
 
 1+ 2
  
!iL✓
i
L+!
i
H✓
i
H
 h@q
@e
i2#
n.d.
(C.9)
Analyzing the comparative statics of ✓iL with respect to  2, the sign depends on B1.
If B1 is higher than 1, the e↵ect of a higher level of substitutability impacts positively on
the informality. in the case of ✓iH the sign is uncertain.
Numerator N13:
@✓iL
@ 2
=
N13
D
> 0 if B2 > 1
@✓iL
@ 2
=
N13
D
< 0 if B2 < 1
(C.10)
N13 =
lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2
( 2 + 1)2
⇤"
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
E1K1  A1 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iHK1 +A1
 
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K
@
i2
!fHE1
#
| {z }
>0 (by simulation)
if B2 > 1
(C.11)
Numerator N23:
@✓iH
@ 2
=
N23
D
n.d. (C.12)
N23 = A1
lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2
( 2 + 1)2
"
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1  
 
1 +  1q(e)
 
!fL
h@K
@
i2
E1
#
n.d.
(C.13)
When  2 changes, impacts negatively on the low skilled informality and has an uncertain
e↵ect on the higher ones:
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Numerator N14:
@✓iL
@ 2
=
N14
D
< 0 (C.14)
N14 =   C2
(1   2)2 ⇤"
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
E1K1  A1 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iHK1 +A1
 
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K
@
i2
!fHE1
#
< 0
(C.15)
Numerator N24:
@✓iH
@ 2
=
N24
D
n.d. (C.16)
N24 =   C2
(1   2)2
"
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1  
 
1 +  1q(e)
 
!fL
h@K
@
i2
E1
#
n.d.
(C.17)
The sign of ✓iH when  2, changes depends on B2. If B2 is higher than 1, the e↵ect of a
higher level of substitutability impacts positively on the informality. in the case of ✓iL the
sign is uncertain.
Numerator N15:
@✓iL
@ 1
=
N15
D
n.d. (C.18)
N15 =
lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1
( 1 + 1)2
"
A2
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)( 
2
1  22)
h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1 A2
 
1+ 1q(e)
 
!fH
h@K
@
i2
E1
#
n.d.
(C.19)
Numerator N25:
@✓iH
@ 1
=
N25
D
> 0 if B1 > 1
@✓iH
@ 1
=
N25
D
< 0 if B1 < 1
(C.20)
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N25 =
lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1
( 1 + 1)2
⇤"
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
E1K1  A2 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1 +A2
 
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K
@
i2
!fLE1
#
N25 > 0
if B1 > 1
(C.21)
The change of  1 has an uncertain e↵ect on ✓iL, and a negative e↵ect on ✓
i
H :
Numerator N16:
@✓iL
@ 1
=
N16
D
n.d. (C.22)
N16 =   C1
(1   1)2
"
A2
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)( 
2
1  22)
h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1 A2
 
1+ 1q(e)
 
!fH
h@K
@
i2
E1
#
n.d.
(C.23)
Numerator N26:
@✓iH
@ 1
=
N26
D
< 0 (C.24)
N26 =   C1
(1   1)2 ⇤"
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
E1K1  A2 1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 h@q
@e
i2
!iLK1 +A2
 
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K
@
i2
!fLE1
#
< 0
(C.25)
The change of the quality parameters a and d on ✓iL and ✓
i
H is negative. If the quality
parameters are higher the informal shares are reduced:
Numerator N17:
@✓iL
@a
=
N17
D
< 0 (C.26)
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N17 = A2
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
⇣
 1+ 2
⌘"
 @q
@a
+
 
!iL✓
i
L+!
i
H✓
i
H
  
 1  2
  @2q
@e@a
K1
#
< 0
(C.27)
Numerator N27:
@✓iH
@a
=
N27
D
< 0 (C.28)
N27 = A1
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
x
(x  ✓iL)2
⇣
 1+ 2
⌘
K1
" 
!iL✓
i
L+!
i
H✓
i
H
  
 1  2
 @q
@e
@2q
@e@a
  @q
@a
E1
#
< 0
(C.29)
Numerator N18:
@✓iL
@d
=
N18
D
< 0 (C.30)
N18 = A2
 
1+ 1q(e)
  1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
⇣
 1+ 2
⌘"
 @K
@
E1K1 
 
!fL(x ✓iL)+!fH(1 x ✓iH)
  
 1  2
  @2K
@@d
#
< 0
(C.31)
Numerator N28:
@✓iH
@d
=
N28
D
< 0 (C.32)
N28 = A1
 
1+ 1q(e)
  x 
x  ✓iH
 2
"
 @K
@d
E1K1+
⇣
!fL(x ✓iL)+!fH(1 x ✓iH)
⌘ @2K
@@d
@K
@
E1
#
< 0
(C.33)
The impact of the taxes ⌧ on ✓iL and ✓
i
H is positive. If there are higher taxes (contri-
butions in the model) the informality is higher:
Numerator N19:
@✓iL
@⌧
=
N19
D
> 0 (C.34)
N19 = A2
1  x 
1  x  ✓iH
 2 1 +K ()1 + ⌧  1 +  1q(e) E1K1 > 0 (C.35)
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Numerator N29:
@✓iH
@⌧
=
N29
D
> 0 (C.36)
N29 = A1
x 
x  ✓iL
 2 1 +K ()1 + ⌧  1 +  1q(e) E1K1 > 0 (C.37)
The e↵ect of the cost parameters (b1 and b2) on the informality is positive in all cases.
If the enforcement and the benefits are more expensive, the informality goes up.
Numerator N110:
@✓iL
@b1
=
N110
D
> 0 (C.38)
N110 =  A2
 
1 +K ()
  
 1 +  2
 
1   2q(e)
1  x 
1  x  ✓iH
 2 @2B@e@b1 @q@eK1 < 0 (C.39)
Numerator N210:
@✓iH
@b1
=
N210
D
> 0 (C.40)
N210 =  A1
 
1 +K ()
  
 1 +  2
 
1   2q(e)
x 
x  ✓iL
 2 @2B@e@b1 @q@eK1 < 0 (C.41)
Numerator N111:
@✓iL
@b2
=
N111
D
> 0 (C.42)
N111 =  A2 1  x 
1  x  ✓iH
 2 @2B@@b2 @K@ E1 < 0 (C.43)
Numerator N211:
@✓iH
@b2
=
N211
D
> 0 (C.44)
N211 =  A1 x 
x  ✓iL
 2 @2B@@b2 @K@ E1 < 0 (C.45)
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1.8.2 Comparative statics of e⇤
The e↵ect of  1 on the equilibrium enforcement is negative, if there are more fines the
quality of the enforcement is lower:
Numerator N31:
@e
@ 1
=
N31
D
< 0 (C.46)
N31 = A2
 
1 +K ()
 
q(e)
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
( 1    2)@q
@e
!iLK1
   1   2q(e)  !iL✓iL + !iH✓iH @q@e @K@
 
x
x  ✓iL
A1( 1    2)@q
@e
!fH +
1  x
1  x  ✓iH
A2
@K
@
!fL
!
< 0
(C.47)
When  2 is higher the sign of the e↵ect on e⇤ is uncertain.
Numerator N32:
@e
@ 2
=
N32
D
n.d. (C.48)
N32 =
 
1 +  1q(e)
 h@K ()
@
i2⇣@q
@e
⌘ 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
  A1!fHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!
f
L(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
1 +  1q(e)
  
 1    2
 
q(e)
⇣@q
@e
⌘
K1
 
A1!iHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!iL(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
x
(x  ✓iL)2
 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
 ⇣@q
@e
⌘
K1 n.d.
(C.49)
The comparative statics of e⇤ with respect to  2 depend on B2. The sign goes in the
same direction as the sign of the change in informality.
Numerator N33:
@e
@ 2
=
N33
D
> 0 if B2 > 1
@e
@ 2
=
N33
D
< 0 if B2 < 1
(C.50)
47
Chapter 1. Informality and government enforcement in Latin America
N33 =   lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2 
 2 + 1
 2 1  x(1  x  ✓iH)2

!iL( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
> 0 ifB2 > 1
N33 =   lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2 
 2 + 1
 2 1  x(1  x  ✓iH)2

!iL( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
< 0 ifB2 < 1
(C.51)
Comparative statics of e⇤ respect to  2:
Numerator N34:
@e
@ 2
=
N34
D
< 0 (C.52)
N34 =
C2
(1   2)2
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2

!iL( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
< 0 (C.53)
The comparative statics of e⇤ with respect to  1 depend on B1. The sign goes in the
same direction as the sign of the change in informality.
Numerator N35:
@e
@ 1
=
N33
D
> 0 if B1 > 1
@e
@ 1
=
N33
D
< 0 if B1 < 1
(C.54)
N35 =   lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1 
 1 + 1
 2 x(x  ✓iL)2

!iH( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
> 0 if B1 > 1
N35 =   lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1 
 1 + 1
 2 x(x  ✓iL)2

!iH( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
< 0 if B1 < 1
(C.55)
As in the case of  2, the e↵ect on e⇤ of a positive change in  1 is negative, when the
informal share has lower weight in the production function, the equilibrium share is lower
and also the level of enforcement.
Numerator N36:
@e
@ 2
=
N34
D
< 0 (C.56)
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N36 =
C1
(1   1)2
x
(x  ✓iL)2

!iH( 1    2)
@q
@e
K1
 
< 0 (C.57)
The e↵ect of the quality parameters is uncertain in the case of a, which is one in the
enforcement function, and negative in the one of the benefits function (d).
Numerator N37:
@e
@a
=
N37
D
n.d. (C.58)
N37 =  
 
1 +  1q(e)
 ✓
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
◆ 
 1    2
  @2q
@e@a
h@K
@
i2 A1!fHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!
f
L(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 21    22
 @q
@e
@q
@a
K1
 
A1!iHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!iL(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
  x
(x  ✓iL)2
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
✓
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
◆ 
 1    2
  @2q
@e@a
K1 n.d.
(C.59)
Numerator N38:
@e
@d
=
N38
D
< 0 (C.60)
N38 =
" 
1 +  1q(e)
  
 1    2
 @K
@
@q
@e
#" 
K1  
✓
!fL(x  ✓iL) + !fH(1  x  ✓iH)
◆
@2K
@e@d
!
 
A1!iHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!iL(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!#
< 0
(C.61)
The e↵ect of the taxes on the equilibrium enforcement is positive, there are more
resources to spend and one of the ways to do it is through the level of enforcement.
Numerator N39:
@e
@⌧
=
N39
D
> 0 (C.62)
N39 =  1 +K ()
1 + ⌧
 
1 +  1q(e)
  
 1    2
 @q
@e
K1
"
A1x!iH 
x  ✓iL
 2 + A2(1  x)!iL 
1  x  ✓iH
 2
#
> 0 (C.63)
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Comparative statics of e respect to b1 and b2:
Numerator N310:
@e
@b1
=
N310
D
(C.64)
Comparative statics of e respect to b1 and b2:
Numerator N311:
@e
@b2
=
N311
D
(C.65)
N311 =
 
1 +  1q(e)
  
 1    2
 @K
@
@q
@e
@B
@@b2
"
A1x!iH 
x  ✓iL
 2 + A2(1  x)!iL 
1  x  ✓iH
 2
#
> 0 (C.66)
1.8.3 Comparative statics of ⇤
The e↵ect of  1 on the equilibrium level of benefits is positive, more fines produce more
resources for the formal workers:
Numerator N41:
@
@ 1
=
N41
D
> 0 (C.67)
N41 =
"
A1!
f
H
x
(x  ✓iL)2
+A2!
f
L
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
#
⇤"
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)( 1 +  2)
 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
 h@q
@e
i2@K
@
   1 +K () q(e)@K
@
E1
#
> 0
(C.68)
Comparative statics of e respect to  2:
Numerator N42:
@e
@ 2
=
N42
D
< 0 (C.69)
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N42 =   1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
 1 +  2
 h@K ()
@
i2h@q
@e
i2 
!iL✓
i
L + !
i
H✓
i
H
  A1!fHx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!
f
L(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
1 +K ()
1   2q(e)
 
1 +  1q(e)
 
q(e)
⇣@K
@
⌘
E1
 
A1!
f
Hx
(x  ✓iL)2
+
A2!
f
L(1  x)
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!
< 0
(C.70)
The e↵ect of  2 in the ⇤ depend on B2 as in the other variables, but the sign is the
opposite than in the case of the informal shares and the enforcement.
Numerator N43:
@
@ 2
=
N43
D
< 0 if B2 > 1
@
@ 2
=
N43
D
> 0 if B2 < 1
(C.71)
N43 =
lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2 
 2 + 1
 2 1  x(1  x  ✓iH)2!fL@K@ E1 < 0 if B2 > 1
N43 =
lnB2B
 1
 2+1
2 
 2 + 1
 2 1  x(1  x  ✓iH)2!fL@K@ E1 > 0 if B2 < 1
(C.72)
The e↵ect of  1 and  2 is positive on . When the weight of the formal workers in the
production function is higher the level of benefits in equilibrium goes in the same direction:
Numerator N44:
@K
@ 2
=
N44
D
> 0 (C.73)
N44 =   C2
(1   2)2
1  x
(1  x  ✓iH)2
!fL
@K
@
E1 > 0 (C.74)
The e↵ect of  1 is similar as in the case of  2:
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Numerator N45:
@
@ 1
=
N45
D
< 0 if B1 > 1
@
@ 1
=
N45
D
> 0 if B1 < 1
(C.75)
N45 =
lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1 
 1 + 1
 2 x(x  ✓iL)2!fH @K@ E1 < 0 if B2 > 1
N45 =
lnB1B
 1
 1+1
1 
 1 + 1
 2 x(x  ✓iL)2!fH @K@ E1 > 0 if B2 < 1
(C.76)
Comparative statics of  respect to  1:
Numerator N46:
@K
@ 1
=
N46
D
> 0 (C.77)
N46 =   C1
(1   1)2
x
(x  ✓iL)2
!fH
@K
@
E1 > 0 (C.78)
The e↵ect of the quality parameters as is expected is positive in the level of benefits
in equilibrium:
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The e↵ect of taxes (⌧) is negative on the benefits, there are fewer formal workers and
the government in equilibrium spends more money on the enforcement task:
Numerator N49:
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Comparative statics of  respect to b1:
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1.8.4 Comparative statics with respect to a couple of parameters
Figure C.1: Changes in the equilibrium with the fines ( 1) and the informal wage losses
( 2)
(a) ✓i⇤H (b) ✓
i⇤
L
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Figure C.2: Changes in the equilibrium with the level of substitutability and the shares
( j and  j).
(a) ✓i⇤H ( 1, 1) (b) ✓
i⇤
L ( 2, 2)
(c) q(e) ( 1, 1) (d) K() ( 1, 1)
(e) q(e) ( 2, 2) (f) K() ( 2, 2)
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Figure C.3: Changes in the equilibrium with the quality parameters (a and d)
(a) ✓i⇤H (b) ✓
i⇤
L
(c) e⇤ (d) ⇤
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Figure C.4: Changes in the equilibrium with quality and cost of the enforcement (a) and
(b1)
(a) ✓i⇤H (b) ✓
i⇤
L
(c) Enforcement
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Figure C.5: Changes in the equilibrium with quality and cost of the benefits (d) and (b2)
(a) ✓i⇤H (b) ✓
i⇤
L
(c) Benefits
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Chapter 2
Drop-out and enforcement during
Two Transfer Programs
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the high school drop-out dynamic, specifically we
focus on those teenagers1 in families which are a↵ected by income shocks because they par-
ticipate in Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) Programs, and how these behavior changes
can be modified by the enforcement level. We develop a structural discrete choice model,
where the decisions are jointly taken by the teenagers and their parents. To estimate the
model parameters, we use data from two programs designed and carried out in Uruguay
in the last decade, the Social Assistance National Plan to the Social Emergency (Plan
de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia, hereinafter PANES) and the Family Allowances
(Asignaciones familiares hereinafter AFAM). These program have requirements for the
participants and one of those is school attendance for those individuals under 18. How-
ever, the level of enforcement in the programs is di↵erent not only because of the program
design, but also over time.
In recent years the share of teenagers who drop-out of high-school and do not enter
the labor market in Uruguay has been a focal point for policy makers and the academia.
According to the ILO (2013), in Uruguay which is in an intermediate level in Latin Amer-
ica, one in five individuals aged between 14 and 19 do not study nor work. In the same
report, they disentangle the activities that these individuals do, discriminating those who
are engaged in home production, those who are jobseekers, and those engaged in other
(inactive) activities . The most worrying feature of this figure in Uruguay and Paraguay
is the high proportion, about 50%, of those individuals who answer that they spend their
time in other (inactive) activities. Combining both statistics shows that Uruguay is the
country in the region where the participation of the individuals between 14 and 24 who
0This chapter is coauthored with Gonzalo Salas.
1In this paper we consider as teenagers individuals between 12 and 18 years old.
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neither study nor work is 10% of the total. Additionally, UM/CIEA (2013) indicates the
share of age between 15 and 29 in the first quintile of income who neither study nor work,
doubled in the last 5 years.
High-school drop-out can be measured with those teenagers who start to attend at
the beginning of the academic years and then quit high school. If we consider those
students who have at least 50 absences during the academic year and are not enrolled in
the educative system in the next academic year, the average rate of drop-out in compulsory
high school has been around 5% yearly over the last decade2. Note that, this is a lower
bound given the threshold is high, considering both 50 absences and the non-enrollment.
Moreover, if we analyze the problem by socio-economic stratus the di↵erences are
dramatic. The rate of attendance of those teenagers who are in the fifth quintile of income
is around 85% in compulsory and non compulsory education, but in the first quintile it is
only 60% for compulsory and around only 25% in non compulsory education (Figure 2.1).
This issue shows first a severe inequality problem, and second the incapacity to jointly
improve the relative development with the GDP growth. Twenty years ago, Uruguay was
at the top of educational performance in Latin America, but after the severe economic
and social crisis in 2002-2003 the country has not being able to back that performance
even though the rate of growth in the decade was the highest in its history.
The nature of drop-out is essentially dynamic. Poor educational performance, i.e. low
Grade Point Average (GPA), in the past has increased its probability (Alexander et al.
(2001); Gri n (2002); Christle et al. (2002)). In this specific process there are two types
of incentives which play a determinant role: i) individual incentives, poor performances
can generate frustration in the individual (Finn (1989)) and can reduce how enjoyable it
is to be in school (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2013)); and ii) household incentive
through the aspirations of parents, that is the child’s educational performance builds par-
ents’ incentives. Because they visualize bad signals emitted by their o↵spring’s outcome,
they stop investing in education (Li and Mumford (2009)). This investment in education
can operate either through the time that parents spend with their children in formative
activities such as reading or homework, or encouraging their children to do it (Boca et al.
(2012)).
The decision to participate in the education system depends on both parents’ and
2The drop-out in the first three years is around 4% and 7% in the 4th one. Source:
http://www.anep.edu.uy/observatorio/.
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teenager’s utilities. When the parents’ utility is low because of poor educational perfor-
mance, they can be compensated by more income if their o↵spring participates in the
labor market. In the case of teenagers, their utility depends on leisure time and the time
spent on alternative activities (school attendance or work). We assume that the utility
that is extracted from attending school depends not only on the GPA but also on course
achievement.
In their seminal paper Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) develop and estimate a structural
model of work decision and high school attendance. They exploit the NLSY793 to know
who drops out and when they do so. They found that those who work contemporaneously
while they attend high school have lower levels in their school performance. When they
analyze some policy experiments they assess some measures, such as work prohibition
which has had some limited success in improving school outcomes. In our paper, we deal
with a particular group of teenagers who are at the bottom of the income distribution and
a significant share of them neither study nor work, which introduces a particular feature
into our model.
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2013) estimate a structural dynamic model to under-
stand and quantify the di↵erent channels from which the college student drops out. They
point out the role of GPA performance in this decision. This paper gives us many insights
into the dynamic of the GPA, but the nature of the decision is quite di↵erent given that
they studied adults and we are working with teenagers.
The economic and financial crisis in Uruguay in 2002 generated a high increase in un-
employment and poverty. For this reason, in 2005 the PANES program was implemented.
A fixed cash transfer was directed to the household regardless of the number of members.
The target population of this program was the first quintile of the poorest population.
Among the required conditions was attendance at school, although there is evidence of
the low level of enforcement and compliance of the requirements (Labat (2012)). In Decem-
ber 2007, this program was ended. From the beginning it had been proposed as transitory
and the families with children under 18 years were integrated into the AFAM program.
This last program is also a CCT, with similar requirements, but it is part of the Social
Protection System. In this case, the target population is to cover all poor households with
children under 18. The amount of the cash transfer depends on the number of children
and if they attend elementary or high school. This latter program include all the PANES
3The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
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beneficiaries with children under 18. The income threshold is higher than in PANES, and
the amount of the transfer is similar but in the case of AFAM, it obviously has a bigger
dispersion by household than AFAM.
The CCTs programs operate on the probability of drop-outs by two mechanisms. First,
in a direct way, due to the fact that one of the conditions to participate in these programs
refers to school attendance. Second, the programs indirectly generate behavioral changes
based on a variation of incentives, decreasing the investment required to study or the
opportunity cost of studying in relation to labor activities.
Todd and Wolpin (2006) analyze the e↵ect of a transfer program PROGRESA in Mex-
ico on child schooling and fertility. They develop a dynamic behavioral model where the
parents first, and then the teenagers decide either to work or attend school and fertility
behavior given the existence of a transfer program. Additionally, they perform some con-
trafactual policy alternatives and propose a di↵erent scheme which leads to better school
performance. Attanasio et al. (2010) also use a structural model to evaluate the PRO-
GRESA in Mexico. They exploit a randomized experiment to assess where the program is
more e↵ective and at which points it could be improved. Our paper goes one step further:
we work with two transfer programs and we analyze how enforcement plays a role in school
participation. Finally, we also include a grade dynamic in the model.
Figure 2.1: Rate of High School Attendance in the first and the fifth quintile and year.
Source: Continuos Household Survey.
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Enforcement is a concept that has been gaining a crucial role in public economic
literature. It involves not only the resources that the government invests to carry out
the programs, but also the individual perception about the quality and its e ciency. The
individual enforcement perception and their externalities are introduced by Alm et al.
(2009) in a paper about tax compliance in a lab experiment, and they were studied by
Rincke and Traxler (2011) in an empirical paper about TV licenses in Austria. They
identified enforcement spillovers where the activity of inspectors leads on average to an
unsolicited registration for every three e↵ectively enforced registrations.
Kaufmann et al. (2012) assess the enforcement relevance in CCT programs focused on
income requirement with data from the Bolsa familia Program in Brazil. These authors
found that people learn about the program enforcement not only with their own experience,
but also with their peer experience. They found that the changes in behavior depend on
public and private signals about the enforcement quality, and this feature is a key point
in the program’s e↵ectiveness.
On comparing both programs, there are some similarities and many di↵erences as is
shown in Table 2.1. Both programs target the beneficiaries through a Baseline Poverty
Score (´Indice de Carencias Cr´ıticas, ICC in spanish) and the formal income per capita of
the household. The ICC identifies the probability that the household is vulnerable, then
the households above a threshold are eligible for the program. Both PANES and AFAM
have the household as an objective, but the AFAM has a wider coverage. Both programs
use di↵erent thresholds with PANES targeting the first quintile of the poorest population
and AFAM putting the emphasis on all the poor children
The main di↵erences are the amount of the transfer and the enforcement mechanism.
The transfer in PANES is the same amount for all the households, a lump sum one.
Conversely, the AFAM transfer is linked with the number of household members and
the educative achievement. The first child of the household receives an amount, which
is multiplied by 0.6 for the other younger child. If the children attend high-school they
receive 30% more as a bonus.
The enforcement in both programs is di↵erent but neither is e cient in regulating the
requirements (specifically education and health), given they are not a main concern for the
policy maker. The enforcement is based on the individual perception that if they not hold
the requirement they will lose the transfer. In terms of perception, PANES enforcement is
higher than that of AFAM, because the probability of losing the entire transfer depends on
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any single children. Conversely, in AFAM if one of the children drops out of the education
system, the household will lose only the part of the transfer that corresponds to that child.
However, the enforcement perception can be understood as higher in the AFAM case,
because when the children start high-school the family has to present the enrollment
certificate in order to receive the 30% bonus. In 2013, the government checked in April if
the children were enrolled in the educative system, and in September checked again the
number of days that they e↵ectively attend school. This change led to the suspension
of some individuals from the program and could spillover to other families through the
enforcement perception.
Table 2.1: Program design.
PANES AFAM
Targeting mechanism ICC & Formal income per
capita
ICC & Formal income per
capita
Population First quintile of poor house-
holds
Poor households with chil-
dren
Transfer Lump sum per household Per children but decreasing
with the number of children
in the household and an ex-
tra to be in high-school.
Enforcement Weak regulation. Weak regulation.
Perception based. Perception based.
The household loses the
transfer if one member does
not meet the requirements.
The household loses the part
of the transfer of the mem-
ber that does not meet the
requirements.
Regulation when the chil-
dren enter high school.
In 2013 strong monitoring.
In 2013, due to the fact the authorities increased the regulation, in April they cancelled
26,000 households (6% of the total) because the children were not enrolled in the school
system, and in November they cancelled 10,500 more because the children did not attend
enough days during the year. Among these transfer cancellations 40% were for children
who should have attended high-school4.
The income requirement has been monitored in both PANES and AFAM programs, but
only the formal income which is registered through the labor records. All those incomes
that the families have from informal jobs cannot be monitored by the government. Around
4In 2014, the enforcement agency continues with this policy.
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5% of the PANES and AFAM beneficiaries exit from the programs because they are above
the formal income threshold. The enforcement of this requirement is widely known and
enters into the decision function of the individual5.
Our paper analyzes the dynamic of drop-out in compulsory and non com-
pulsory education and, how it is a↵ected by the shocks of income and the
attendance enforcement when the households have access to one (or both) of
the CCT programs. We analyze individuals who go through the high school when
there are two di↵erent programs, PANES and AFAM, which have the same objective of
encouraging school participation but the enforcement perception is di↵erent.
We will focus on three points which are not analyzed in the literature: first, how is
the utility formation for those who neither study nor work; second, what is the role of
the time of home production, and finally we analyze how the CCT program is designed,
particularly how is the function that determines the loss of the transfer and the level of
enforcement that the government agency applies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data bases
and the main descriptive statistics. In section 3 the model is developed. In section 4 the
estimation strategy is presented. In section 5 we present the results and in section 6 we
perform some policy experiments. Finally section 7 concludes.
2.2 The Data and Descriptive Statistics
Educational performance is a heterogeneous phenomenon, richer teenagers attend more
classes than poorer ones, and even in compulsory education the di↵erence is quite sig-
nificant (see Figure 2.1). Around 85% of the richer teenagers attend compulsory and
non-compulsory high-school, and around 60% of poorer teenagers attend compulsory and
25% non-compulsory high-school. The e↵ect of the crisis can be seen in the decrease in
attendance in the poorest ones; although this process did not stop in 2007 even though the
PANES had been implemented. In 2011, when the AFAM was in progress, the attendance
increased significantly, even when demand for labor was the highest in the history of this
country.
This paper focused on the poorest population which is around the threshold determined
to participate in the CCT programs. The information used in this paper comes from
5Similar features are identified by the World-Bank (2010) for Colombia.
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administrative records and surveys that can be combined using the national ID number
of the person. They are: the follow-up survey of PANES (FSP) and the high-school
education record (SER). The PANES is a transient program that started in April 2005
and ended in December 2007. The most important component was a lump sum transfer6
which is independent of the number of household members7. The target population of this
program was the first quintile of the poorest households.
The FSP consists of data collected as part of the evaluation of the PANES program.
We have two waves of this survey. The first wave is primarily from 2006, although part of
it corresponds to 2007, and the second one corresponds to 2008. In this follow-up survey,
it is possible to identify the beneficiaries of the program (treatment group) and those who
applied but were not selected (control group). The beneficiary selection criterion arises
from the ICC. This survey considers only the population that is around the cuto↵ that
identifies the treated and untreated groups.
The AFAM transfer depends on the number of children in the household and the
educative level. The amount for children depends on whether they are in high-school
(30% bonus) and for the younger members of the household to the transfers a factor of
0.6 is applied.
In the same fashion as FSP, the Follow-up survey for AFAM (FSA) is an instrument
used to evaluate the AFAM program. In this case, we have only one wave in 2011. The
criteria allow us to identify the treated and control population in a similar way to the
FSP, through the ICC and formal per capita income threshold.
To complement the FSP and FSA data, they are combined with information from SER,
which contains data on the educational performance of students in secondary education,
the Grade Point Average (GPA). This cycle starts at 12 years of age, after 6 years of
primary education. This education stage is divided into two cycles, the first three years
correspond to the basic cycle (compulsory education) and the last three to the advanced
cycle (non compulsory high-school)8. Additionally, we estimate the home production time
with the Use of Time Survey carried out in 2008 by the National Statistics Institute9.
In Table 2.2, we show the mean and standard deviation of the main variables during the
6In spanish was called: Ingreso ciudadano.
7In addition, households with children received a food card (in-kind transfer) where amount depended
on the number of children in the household.
8In spanish are called: Ciclo ba´sico y bachillerato diversificado respectively.
9The result of the estimation model is presented in the Table D.4.
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period of both CCT programs. In the first panel, the data about PANES can be observed.
We consider 3090 observations of 12 to 18 year old individuals. Of this population 75%
attended the school system. However only 55% attended compulsory high-school school
(1716 observations) and 44% attended non-compulsory high-school (1362 observations).
Of these cases we can only locate 707 students in the SER due to the absence of an ID.
We do not observe significant changes in the distribution of variables as a consequence
of the missing cases. In our sample 70% of the population were treated, nearly 65%
carried out home production and 6% were working. Specific information about educational
performance shows that 35% fail the course that they attend (obtain an F) and only 20%
obtained a GPA of A. Finally, less than 9% attended 5th and 6th grade of high-school.
In the second panel we show data about the AFAM period. There, 82% attended formal
education (7 points more than in the PANES). We consider 2796 individuals between 12
and 18 years old, and we have high-school records for 952 of them. The age and the treated
population is similar to PANES. The estimation of home production is also quite similar.
However, the AFAM population work less than the PANES one, 3 points less.
We define four states with the combination of studying and working choices. In Table
2.3, we present the distribution of hours worked and home production by age. Furthermore,
we show the distribution of the states that are of our interest, which are teenagers who
only study (sn), those who study and work (sw), those who neither study nor work (nn),
and those who only work (nw). In this case we observe the number of teenagers who only
study decreases significantly with age, but the trend is increasing for those who neither
attend school nor work. Additionally, the percentage of those who study and work is
always less than 10%. In the case of hours worked we note that it increases with age as
expected. The increase in hours allocated to home production presents an irregular trend.
Comparing both programs, during AFAM there are more teenagers studying and not
working and this is because of the decrease in those who neither study nor work.
The distribution of GPA by age and grade is presented in Table 2.4. The grade
performance is worse when students attend higher level courses and with their age. About
64% of those older than 16 years old and 72% of those enrolled in 5th and 6th grade fail
the course. This di↵erence is due to the fact that students are enrolled in lower courses
that would correspond to their age because of repeated fails. The percentage that obtains
the best GPA is constant between first and fourth grade (20%), and decreases to only 10%
in the last two grades.
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PANES
FSP HS attendance (FSP) FSP and SER
Obs. Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D
Age 12-18
Attendance 3090 0.746 0.435
Age 3093 14.83 2.014 1330 14.60 1.769 707 14.11 1.566
Treatment 3093 0.701 0.458 1330 0.689 0.463 707 0.680 0.466
Home Production
0 3079 0.333 0.471 1322 0.332 0.471 703 0.354 0.478
0-10 3079 0.315 0.464 1322 0.378 0.485 703 0.404 0.491
> 10 3079 0.351 0.477 1322 0.290 0.453 703 0.242 0.428
GPA
F 707 0.349 0.477
B 707 0.444 0.497
A 707 0.206 0.405
Grade
1-2 707 0.584 0.493
3-4 707 0.328 0.470
5-6 707 0.088 0.283
Age 14-18
Hours
0 2093 0.823 0.381 903 0.905 0.294 423 0.941 0.236
0-15 2093 0.062 0.241 903 0.041 0.198 423 0.031 0.173
> 15 2093 0.097 0.296 903 0.043 0.203 423 0.021 0.144
AFAM
FSA HS attendance (FSA) FSA and SER
Obs. Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D Obs. Mean S.D
Age 12-18
Attendance 2796 0.821 0.382
Age 2936 14.93 1.0 1555 14.82 1.72 952 14.43 1.47
Treatment 2936 0.731 0,443 1555 0.692 0.462 952 0.721 0.448
Home Production
0 2641 0.141 0.348 1484 0.127 0.333 917 0.154 0.361
0-10 2641 0.541 0.498 1484 0.582 0.493 917 0.581 0.493
> 10 2641 0.318 0.466 1484 0.291 0.454 917 0.265 0.441
Grade
1-2 952 0.574 0.494
3-4 952 0.425 0.494
Age 14-18
Hours
0 1901 0.868 0.338 1116 0.945 0.227 644 0.973 0.160
0-15 1901 0.03 0.18 0 1116 0.02 0.142 644 0.01 0.103
> 15 1901 0.10 0.297 1116 0.04 0.181 644 0.016 0.123
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics. Source: FSP, FSA and SER.
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PANES
State Hours Worked Home Production
sn sw nn nw 0 0-15 > 15 0 0-10 > 10
12-13 0.82 -.- 0.18 -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.44 0.49 0.08
14-15 0.77 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.93 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.60 0.38
> 16 0.51 0.06 0.28 0.15 0.80 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.48 0.40
AFAM
State Hours Worked Home Production
sn sw nn nw 0 0-15 > 15 0 0-10 > 10
12-13 0.96 -.- 0.04 -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.40 0.52 0.08
14-15 0.86 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.95 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.58 0.34
> 16 0.61 0.07 0.20 0.12 0.81 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.52 0.48
Table 2.3: Decisions by group of age. Source: FSP, FSA and SER.
GPA Age Grade
12-13 14-15 > 16 1-2 3-4 5-6
F 0.22 0.40 0.64 0.34 0.33 0.72
B 0.50 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.46 0.18
A 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.10
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2.4: The grades distribution by age group. Source: FSP and SER.
Finally, the transition rates between states in consecutive years are shown in Table
2.5. The state sn is more stable than the others, about one third of the population
is only studying and remains there the next year. In any other case the proportion of
the population in the same state exceeds 10%. The largest movements occur to study
exclusively from all the other states. Of those sw in t  1, the next year about 60% stop
working and continue studying, this percentage is 28% and 43% for the case of nn and sw,
respectively.
2.3 Model
We develop a dynamic model of sequential decisions under uncertainty which is based
on the basic model of the seminal paper of Eckstein and Wolpin (1999). Household utility
depends on the time allocation of the teenager, whether he attends school, produces at
home, works in the market or enjoys leisure. Additionally, that allocation determines if
the household receives (or continues receiving) the CCT. Here we consider the utility that
the teenager brings to the household weighting the utility that the teenager directly enjoys
(Uch), and the utility that the parents (Up) enjoy through the teenager’s time allocation.
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snt 1 swt 1 nnt 1 nwt 1 Total
snt 54.6 3.1 2.3 5.0 65.0
swt 4.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 5.9
nnt 10.7 0.9 4.2 3.2 19.1
nwt 4.9 0.7 1.5 2.8 10.0
Total 74.6 5.2 8.5 11.7 100.0
State Distribution of t on t-1
snt 1 swt 1 nnt 1 nwt 1
snt 73.2 58.4 27.8 42.9
swt 5.9 10.9 4.3 5.4
nnt 14.3 16.8 50.0 27.7
nwt 6.6 13.9 17.9 24.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2.5: Transitions of states. Source: FSP, FSA and SER.
The weight ( t) depends on the age of the teenager, if the age is below 14 the parent’s
weight is relatively higher than when they are over 14. The teenager values school atten-
dance, market work and leisure time (total time minus the hours of market work and home
production). The parents value school attendance, market work and home production.
Ut =  tUch,t + (1   t)Up,t (2.1)
This utility function could be thought of as the result of a bargaining process between
teenager and parents about the teenager’s time allocation where the bargaining power
changes with the teenager’s age. In the literature of family economics this formalization
is used in the decision making of couples (Browning et al. (2014)), not of teenagers.
Figure 2.2 shows the choices that the household can take. The decision is how to split
the time between school attendance, home production, leisure and market work, when
they are legally able to work.
Given the total hours available L1 (73 hours per week10) for those who attend school,
L2 (98 hours per week11) for those who do not attend the rewards in each situation
k = {sn, sw, nn, nw} depend on the value of attending school (bs), the value of leisure
(bn), the value of working in the market (!hw), and the value of home production (bhphhp).
The utility is a weighted function of the teenager and parents’ utility function.
10This computation is the result of considering that they have 14 hours available per day (after consid-
ering sleep, food and clean time) minus 25 weekly hours to attend school and study.
11This computation is the result of considering that they have14 hours available per day.
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of the individual in the model by age (t)
The value when the teenager attends school and does not work (U sn) includes the
value of leisure, the value of studying for both, teenagers and parents; and the value of
home production in the case of the utility of the parents. The value of studying and
working (U sw) includes the rewards of working (!hw), which is split between the teenager
and their parents. The value of neither studying nor working (Unn) includes only leisure
and home production. The value of not studying and working includes home production
and rewards of working (Unw). Finally, the value of the CCT is included in the parents
utility function, and it is multiplied by the enforcement parameter ⌘, if the teenagers are
not attending formal education. This parameter summarizes the enforcement spillover of
the program, e.g. the perceived probability of being monitored. The transfer depends
on the program and whether the family is above the formal income, insofar that income
enforcement is perfect.
Teenager utility comes from leisure, school attendance and work in the market:
U snch,t = B
n
1,t
⇣
L1   hhpt
⌘
+Bs1,t
U swch,t = B
n
1,t
⇣
L1   hwt   hhpt
⌘
+Bs1,t + !th
w
t
Unnch,t = B
n
1,t
⇣
L2   hhpt
⌘
Unwch,t = B
n
1,t
⇣
L2   hwt   hhpt
⌘
+ !th
w
t
(2.2)
Parent utility comes from school attendance, time allocated in home production (hhpt ),
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time working in the market (hwt ) and the CCT (Tt):
U snp,t = B
s
2,t +B
hp(hhpt ) + Tt
U swp,t = B
s
2,t +B
hp(hhpt ) + !th
w
t + Tt
Unnp,t = B
hp(hhpt ) +
 
1  ⌘ Tt
Unwp,t = B
hp(hhpt ) + !th
w
t +
 
1  ⌘ Tt
(2.3)
The value of the leisure for the teenager depends positively on the age (t), and it is
convex in the hours that they do not spend working in the market, on home production,
or in formal education. The value depend also on a set of parameters (bn1t, b
n
2 and b
n
11).
Bn1t(h) = b
n
1t(h
n)b
n
2 + bn11 (2.4)
The reward in school depends on the grades in the last period (gpat 1), the level of
education achieved (Et 1), the hours spent working in the market (hhw) and on home
production (hhp) and two parameters (bs1 and b
s
2), one for the teenager and other for the
parents.
Bs1t = b
s
1
 
gpat 1, Et 1, hhp, hhw
!
+ ✏st (2.5)
Bs2t = b
s
2
 
gpat 1, Et 1
!
+ ✏st (2.6)
The enforcement parameters are di↵erent for the two CCT programs (⌘PANES and
⌘AFAM ):
⌘ 2 [0, 1] if ⌘ =
8<:0 if enforcement does not exist1 if full enforcement
The grades follow an ordered logit process which depends on the age, the lag of grades,
the work hours, the home production hours and the CCT. The grades can take three values
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(A, B and F) the lower one means that the student fails the course.
gpa⇤ = X  + e e/X ⇠ N(0, 1)
gpat = F if gpa
⇤ < ⌫1
gpat = B if ⌫1 < gpa
⇤ < ⌫2
gpat = A if gpa
⇤ > ⌫2
The CCT can be received by a household where the teenager attends school in the
first period. Then, in the following periods the household can continue receiving the CCT
which depends on school attendance, an income shock and the government enforcement.
The probability of losing the income of CCT programs by a formal income shock12 are p1
if the student is not working, and p2 for those who are working. These percentages are
estimated in two groups: for those who are between 12 and 14, and for those between 15
and 17 years old.
P (CCT = 0/CCT = 1, nw) = p1(t)
P (CCT = 0/CCT = 1, w) = p2(t)
(2.7)
The reward of the home production depends on parameters bhpt , the age (t) and the
hours on home production(hhp):
Bhpt (h) = b
hp
1t ⇤ t ⇤ (hhp)b
hp
2 (2.8)
The wage in each moment is determined by the age (t), the school attendance (Att),
the level of education achieved (CSt 113, Bt 114), the time spent on home production
(hhpt ) and whether the household receives the CCT transfer. The estimation is done in
two steps, in the first step we estimate the probability of being working, and in the second
step including the Mills ratio to correct the selection bias.
ln!t =  0 +  1
 
t
 
+  2Att +  3CSt 1 +  4Bt 1 +  5hhpt +  6CCT +  7Mills+ ✏
w
t (2.9)
12Note that those teenagers who are working they do mainly in the informal market, then the exit from
the program due to formal income shock is determined by the work decision of their parents
13Compulsory high school (Ciclo ba´sico in spanish).
14Non compulsory high school (Bachillerato in spanish).
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The shocks structure is as follows:
 
✏st , ✏
w
t
  ⇠ N(µ,⌃) µ = (µs, µw) ⌃ =   s 0
0  w
!
(2.10)
The Bellman Equations are shown in Equation 2.11 for each choice and depend on the
vector of states St, which are Ct the accumulated course, the work hours hw, the home
production hours hhp, the gpa, the age, the CCT (control or treatment) and the shocks
(✏s and ✏w):
Vt(St) = maxE
"
TX
⌧=t
 ⌧ t
X
k
Ukt d
k
t /St
#
k = {sn, sw, nn, nw}
St =
n
Ct, h
w, hhp, gpa, t, T, ✏0ts
o (2.11)
Vt(St) = U
k
t +  E

Vt+1(St+1)|Stdt
 
(2.12)
The value function t < 18 of the di↵erent choices are:
Vt(St) = max

V snt (St), V
sw
t (St), V
nn
t (St), V
nw
t (St)
 
(2.13)
As in Attanasio et al. (2010), the value function at t = 18 is V18(S18) which depends
on the educational achievement, given that CS is the completed compulsory school and
B is the completed non compulsory school. The parameters are estimated in the model.
V18(S18) =
↵1
1 + e ↵2CS18 ↵3B18 ↵4Et 1
(2.14)
2.4 Estimation
The individuals used to estimate the model can enter in two moments, at the beginning
of PANES (then they are in that program for 2 years, and then receive AFAM for a
maximum of 4 years) or at the beginning of AFAM (and they are in that program for
a maximum of 6 years ). They can enter at any age between 12 and 17, but the exit is
always at 18 years-old. At the entrance the age distribution, the educational level and
treated and control status by program are shown in Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3, and these
74
Chapter 2. Drop-out and enforcement during Two Transfer Programs
characteristics are the initial heterogeneity in the model.
Comparing the background of the teenagers when they enter in the programs, there
are some slight di↵erences. The control teenagers have a slightly better educational back-
ground than the treated ones. Moreover, the AFAM individuals have a better background
than the PANES ones, note that the AFAM program is more extensive than the PANES
and, consequently, the AFAM teenagers have a better socioeconomic situation and a bet-
ter educational background. We can observe in Tables D.2 and D.3, that those teenagers
who have not completed primary school are at least 10 points lower when we consider the
AFAM population in comparison with the PANES population.
The estimation strategy has two steps. In the first one we estimate out of the model
the wage function, the GPA function and transition. The second step is the estimation
of a group of parameters within the model through the Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM).
The parameters estimated out of the model are shown in Tables D.5 - D.7. In the wage
equation (Table D.5) we observe that wages and education are negatively correlated, be-
cause the wages are determined by specific experience and those who have more education
lack this experience. Home production has a positive correlation with wage because there
is a complementarity between the intensity in the labor market and the amount of tasks
that the teenager does at home.
The GPA dynamics are shown in Table D.6. Performance in t 1 has a positive impact
on t. The probability of increasing GPA in t is similar for age, but people over 14 years do
not change their probability in t when obtaining F or B in t 1. Neither home production
time nor the market work time coe cients are significant.
Finally, we perform a multinomial logit to estimate the transition between states in the
model. As is expected, not only is there some stability of states between t and t  1, but
also there are significant movements between nn and nw (on both sides). The probability
of losing the CCT by a formal income shock is estimated using the administrative records
and setting in p1 as 5.08% and 3.97% and p2 as 4.69% and 5.88% at the ages of 12-14 and
15-17 respectively. .
The second step of the estimation is through the SMM minimizing the distance be-
tween the simulated moments from the model and the data, weighing with the inverse of
the simulated variance of the moments. To construct the list of moments we take into
consideration the treated and control group. The first one is defined as those who receive
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the CCT in the year of entrance in the model, and the latter one the others. We construct
the mean for the four states sn, sw, nn, and nw by age and for both programs (PANES
and AFAM). Additionally, we consider as moments the time spent on home production,
the time working in the market and the grades by age, program and for control and treated
populations. These parameters are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
Total Hours
L1 (Study) 3536
L2 (Non Study) 5096
Home production hours
HP1 312
HP2 624
Market Work hours
W1 520
W2 1040
Table 2.6: Calibration: Hours per year (L2 means 14 hours per day), (L1 is equal to L2
minus 25 hours to attend school).
The total number of hours that the teenagers have to spend is 98 hours per week. If
they attend school, they spend 25 hours in that activity. Then they can choose to do some
home production 0, 6 or 12 hours per week and work in the market 0, 10 or 20 hours per
week. The values per year are shown in Table 2.6.
12 -13 14 -15 16-17
 t 0.3082 0.5808 0.7613
(0.000344 ) (0.00235) (0.00255)
bn1t 5.42 90.68 90.68
(0.112) (31.76) (31.76)
bn2 8.99 8.99 8.99
(0.343) (0.343) (0.343)
bhp1t 262.95 121.69 198.03
(37.15) (6.25) (10.34)
bhp2 6.89 6.89 6.89
(0.228) (0.228) (0.228)
Table 2.7: Estimation: Parameters estimated by SMM.
The parameter estimation shows that the leisure values increase with age and obviously
with the number of hours that the teenagers have available after the school decision, as is
shown in Figure D.1. The value of home production does not show a monotone behavior
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with age (Figure D.2). In Figure D.3 there is the value of studying which increases in the
GPA and in the grade achievement.
Parameter Value Std Deviation
  0.9152 (0.0061)
School utility
b1 16382.4 (895.57)
b2 10450.0 (369.15)
Enforcement parameters
⌘PANES 0.057 (0.0012)
⌘AFAM 0.1109 (0.0092)
Shocks : means and standard deviation
µs 0 Calibrated
µw -0.838 (0.0021)
 s 411.26 (64.038)
 w 0.5514 (0.0015)
Final utility function values
↵1 23024 (2059.66)
↵2 0.5315 (0.0012)
↵3 0.5555 (0.00092)
↵4 0.5355 (0.00083)
Table 2.8: Estimation: Parameters estimated by SMM.
The value that the individuals have at the age of 18 depends on equation 2.14 and
the set of parameters in Table 2.8, where ↵1 is the parameter of Compulsory High school
achievement, ↵2 the Non compulsory achievement and ↵3 the parameter of each grade
achievement. The values are shown in Figure D.4
2.5 Results
In this section, we present how well the model fits with the main moments from the
data. In the set of Tables 2.9 - 2.12 we show how well the model fits with the states (sn,
sw, nn and nw) in both programs for treated and control populations. The model fits
well with the only exception being for control populations (at the age of 16 and 17) where
there is an underestimation of sn and an overestimation of nn. As we analyze the initial
heterogeneity, these teenagers have better conditions than the treated ones. In the model,
using the same parametrization could induce these mismatches. These mismatches are
observed in depth in the case of AFAM.
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sn sw nn nw
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12 1 0.9819 -.- -.- 0 0.0181 -.- -.-
13 0.965 0.9930 -.- -.- 0.035 0.0070 -.- -.-
14 0.759 0.7216 0.0560 0.0067 0.167 0.1998 0.018 0.0719
15 0.764 0.7703 0.0430 0.0071 0.134 0.0990 0.059 0.1237
16 0.627 0.5929 0.0630 0.0007 0.233 0.2340 0.077 0.1724
17 0.521 0.5470 0.0660 0.0000 0.266 0.2140 0.147 0.2391
Table 2.9: Model: PANES Treated.
In Tables 2.9 - 2.12 we can also observe also that the working condition is a bit
overestimated, in particular the teenagers in the model have a lot of incentives to only
work, and at the same time the state study and working cannot match the data at that
age. In sum, the model can capture well the decision to work or not, but it has more
problems to disentangle those who work and study, from those who do not.
sn sw nn nw
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12 0.951 0.9978 -.- -.- 0.049 0.0022 -.- -.-
13 0.946 0.9601 -.- -.- 0.054 0.0399 -.- -.-
14 0.861 0.7271 0.031 0.0077 0.108 0.1967 0 0.0685
15 0.748 0.6994 0.038 0.0202 0.206 0.1233 0.008 0.1571
16 0.630 0.5090 0.076 0.0022 0.219 0.2698 0.075 0.2189
17 0.524 0.5154 0.04 0.0000 0.301 0.2125 0.135 0.2721
Table 2.10: Model fit: PANES Control.
In the comparison of treated and control teenagers, the model captures a slightly higher
attendance rate for the treated ones. The construction of the paths depends on the initial
heterogeneity, which is better for the control ones. The rewards are also a little higher
than the control ones because in the data there is a selection process and those teenagers
that attend are the better ones.
The model also properly fits the home production, the work behavior and the grade
achievement as is shown in Tables D.8-D.10. In the case of the home production the model
can disentangle the teenagers that do less and more than 10 hours per week. The model is
able to replicate the trend by age in the two time brackets, in the first one there is no clear
trend and in the second one it is clearly increasing by age. In the case of work hours, the
model has more problems to fit the market work hours properly, because as we mentioned
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sn sw nn nw
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12 0.985 0.9917 -.- -.- 0.015 0.0083 -.- -.-
13 0.924 0.9936 -.- -.- 0.076 0.0064 -.- -.-
14 0.880 0.7742 0.006 0.0058 0.092 0.1565 0.020 0.0635
15 0.805 0.8282 0.025 0.0048 0.131 0.0722 0.039 0.0948
16 0.716 0.6617 0.043 0.0005 0.167 0.1751 0.074 0.1626
17 0.608 0.6114 0.057 0.0000 0.223 0.1553 0.112 0.2333
Table 2.11: Model fit: AFAM treated.
before the model overestimates the more intensive workers, and underestimates the less
intensive ones.
sn sw nn nw
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12 1 0.9930 -.- -.- 0 0.0070 -.- -.-
13 1 0.9717 -.- -.- 0 0.0283 -.- -.-
14 0.908 0.7903 0.042 0.0078 0.050 0.1695 0 0.0325
15 0.871 0.7858 0.008 0.0291 0.081 0.1091 0.040 0.0761
16 0.807 0.6252 0.038 0.0031 0.115 0.2604 0.038 0.1113
17 0.767 0.6674 0.048 0.0000 0.146 0.1784 0.039 0.1542
Table 2.12: Model fit: AFAM control.
The model captures well the GPA behavior along the ages of the teenagers as is shown
in Table D.10. Not only is the trend well captured where A and B are decreasing, and F
is increasing, but also the level. Note that, at the age of 12 the percentages are 14.2%,
54.0% and 31.8% for the GPA, F, B and A respectively and those grades at the age of 17
are 57.0%, 31.6% and 11.3%.
2.6 Policy experiments
In the section we perform policy experiments with the enforcement parameters, firstly
we set the enforcement parameters 50 points higher, and secondly we set the enforcement
parameter at the maximum. Finally, we perform an experiment reducing the amount of
the transfers.
Firstly, we set the enforcement parameters ⌘PANES at 0.557 instead at 0.057, and
⌘AFAM at 0.611 instead at 0.111. In Table 2.13 we observe the e↵ect of the policy exper-
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PANES: ⌘PANES : 0.557
sn sw nn nw
14 0.0890 0.0018 -0.0345 -0.0562
15 0.0467 0.0015 -0.0520 0.0038
16 0.0480 0.0021 -0.0213 -0.0288
17 0.0338 0.0000 -0.0413 -0.0075
AFAM: ⌘AFAM : 0.611
sn sw nn nw
14 0.0671 -0.0048 -0.0280 -0.0438
15 0.0394 0.0123 -0.0363 -0.0154
16 0.0533 0.0029 -0.0297 -0.0265
17 0.0517 0.000 -0.0464 -0.0053
Table 2.13: Policy experiment: Di↵erences between treated and control and policy of
increasing the enforcement parameter.
iment in both programs, observing the di↵erence-di↵erence between treated and control,
and between policy and benchmark. There is a rise in the teenagers that only study and
those who study and work and a fall those who do not study or work and those who do
not study and work. These rises are higher in PANES than AFAM for the younger ones,
due to the fact that the teenagers in the first program have a better background than in
the second one.
Secondly, we set the enforcement parameters at the maximum (⌘PANES and ⌘AFAM )
at 1. In Table 2.14 the e↵ect of the states is shown. The e↵ect is quite big, in the early
ages the e↵ect is slightly bigger than in the latter ones. Those teenagers that study more,
mainly come from those who neither study nor work in contrast to the last case. Here
again the e↵ect is higher in PANES than in AFAM, although in this case it is for ages.
The di↵erence of the policy experiment in home production and work hours15 can be
observed in the first panel of Table 2.15. The most important change is the decrease
of home production in the younger ages (12-13 years old). In those ages there are no
significant changes among states, because more than 90% of those teenagers attend school
anyway, although there are changes in the use of their time. For those over 14, there is an
e↵ect of reducing the number of hours in home production, with a fall of those who do 12
hours per week, and a slight increment for the less intensive ones.
In the second panel of Table 2.15, we show the e↵ect over the market work hours,
15Similar result are found in the case that ⌘ is at 0.557 and 0.6111.
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PANES: ⌘PANES : 1.00
sn sw nn nw
14 0.1611 0.0143 -0.166 -0.031
15 0.0987 0.0136 -0.100 -0.033
16 0.0986 -0.0001 -0.120 -0.025
17 0.0969 0.000 -0.144 0.007
AFAM: ⌘AFAM : 1.00
sn sw nn nw
14 0.1218 0.0169 -0.0994 -0.0393
15 0.0716 0.0152 -0.0368 -0.0499
16 0.0912 0.000 -0.0670 -0.0243
17 0.0878 0.000 -0.0687 -0.0191
Table 2.14: Policy experiment: Di↵erences between treated and control and policy of
increasing the enforcement parameter at 1.
there is a fall in the share of teenagers that work more (more than 15 hours), and an slight
increase of less intensive workers. As we analyzed before, the e↵ect over those who study
and work contemporaneously is little, but positive.
PANES AFAM
0-10 hours >10 hours 0-10 hours >10 hours
12-13 -0.1500 0.0003 -0.0922 0.0134
14-15 0.0098 -0.0281 0.0403 -0.0121
16-17 0.0157 -0.0048 0.0074 -0.0063
PANES AFAM
0-15 hours >15 hours 0-15 hours >15 hours
14-15 0.0096 -0.0158 0.0108 -0.0186
16-17 0.0061 -0.0199 0.0091 -0.0273
Table 2.15: Policy experiment: Di↵erences between treated and control and policy of
increasing the enforcement parameter at 1.
Regarding, the di↵erence in GPA for the e↵ect of the policy, there are less individuals
that fail the course and there is an increment of both A and B for all ages. This positive
impact in the GPA is generated by the fact that in the ordered probit that generate the
grades, being treated has a positive e↵ect on the positive grades (A and B).
Finally, we perform a policy experiment that decreases the amount of transfer by 50%,
The di↵erence between treated and control because of this policy is the decrease of those
teenagers that only study in both programs, and there is a split between those who study
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GPA
F B A
12 0.0074 -0.0057 -0.0017
13 -0.0182 0.0258 -0.0076
14 -0.0893 0.0652 0.0241
15 -0.0674 0.0417 0.0257
16 -0.0463 0.0271 0.0192
17 -0.0496 0.0369 0.0127
Table 2.16: Policy experiment: Di↵erences between treated and control and policy of
increasing the enforcement rate at 1.
and work, those who neither study nor work and those who only work. In all these states
there is an increment of participation. Then, when the transfers is reduced the teenagers
go to the other states, but do not necessary drop-out from formal education.
PANES
sn sw nn nw
14 -0.0344 0.0051 0.0252 0.0041
15 -0.0746 0.0136 0.0218 0.0392
16 -0.0321 0.011 0.0104 0.0205
17 -0.0161 0.000 0.0262 -0.0101
AFAM
sn sw nn nw
14 -0.0503 0.0084 0.0371 0.0047
15 -0.0468 0.0209 0.0141 0.0119
16 -0.0174 0.0026 0.0052 0.0097
17 -0.0055 0.000 0.0073 -0.0018
Table 2.17: Policy experiment: Di↵erences between treated and control and policy of
decreasing the transfer by 50 points.
2.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we develop a dynamic model of the teenagers’ use of time, when they are
elegible to receive a CCT program. We model not only school attendance, but also the
work and the home production behavior. Moreover, we model the enforcement of the CCT
program, pointing out the estimation of a parameter that shows how the beneficiaries
perceive the enforcement level. We exploit a wide, rich and novel data set combining
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administrative records and survey data for Uruguay for two CCT programs, in which one
of the conditions was school attendance.
In the model, the decision is taken by the teenagers and their parents, given the utility
that each decision brings to the household, but the weight of the teenagers in the decision
changes over time. This model captures well the state distribution of the individuals not
only among the school attendance and market working conditions, but also the time that
they spend on home production. One of the features that we exploit is the large percentage
of teenagers that neither study nor work, and this is a challenge at the moment to model.
We perform three policy experiments to assess the role of the enforcement parameter
and the amount of the transfer in the household decision. When the enforcement is higher
the treated teenagers attend formal education more, especially in the middle ages (14-17),
before there is no room to improve given the higher rates. Those teenagers in the early
ages cannot attend more but they change their use of time, spending fewer hours on home
production. Those teenagers who are legally able to work do it less and with less intensity.
Finally, we perform a third policy, reducing the amount of the transfer by 50%. In this
case, the e↵ect in PANES treated is higher than in AFAM and there is only a decrease in
those who only study, and an increase in the share of all the other states.
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2.8 Appendix
PANES AFAM
Age Total Treat Control Total Treat Control
12 17.4 11.9 5.5 17.0 12.9 4.1
13 16.6 12.6 4.1 15.2 11.9 3.3
14 17.1 11.2 5.9 18.3 13.4 4.9
15 16.1 11.2 4.9 16.6 11.7 4.9
16 17.6 13.6 3.9 16.6 12.3 4.3
17 15.2 11.1 4.2 16.3 12.0 4.3
Table D.1: Age and treatment distribution at the entrance moment.
Age Primary High-school
Incompleted Completed 1 2 3 4 5 6
Total
12 76.6 23.4
13 49.8 28.1 22.1
14 34.5 20.9 26.3 18.3
15 31.7 14.5 21.0 19.9 12.9
16 31.1 9.7 18.3 16.6 16.0 8.3
17 33.6 6.7 15.7 15.3 14.3 9.4 5.0
Treat
12 79.4 20.6
13 54.3 26.3 19.4
14 39.0 20.9 24.3 15.8
15 36.8 14.8 20.5 17.5 10.4
16 35.8 10.0 18.5 15.7 13.6 6.4
17 38.2 6.6 16.0 14.5 12.9 8.0 3.8
Control
12 69.0 31.0
13 38.1 32.8 29.1
14 23.9 20.8 30.8 24.5
15 19.7 13.9 22.2 25.4 18.8
16 20.4 9.0 17.8 18.5 21.4 12.9
17 23.8 6.9 15.2 16.8 17.2 12.5 7.6
Table D.2: Education background at the moment of entering in PANES.
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Age Primary High-school
Incompleted Completed 1 2 3 4 5 6
Total
12 67.3 32.7
13 34.2 21.4 44.4
14 24.8 9.5 30.1 35.6
15 18.9 10.5 27.4 22.1 21.1
16 18.0 9.5 33.3 23.5 13.9 1.8
17 19.7 4.0 24.0 32.1 17.2 1.8 1.2
Treat
12 69.8 30.2
13 37.1 18.8 44.1
14 28.0 10.6 29.6 31.8
15 19.6 9.6 28.8 19.9 22.1
16 20.1 9.8 31.7 23.6 13.0 1.8
17 23.4 4.7 23.4 30.4 16.4 1.3 0.4
Control
12 59.4 40.6
13 24.2 30.3 45.5
14 15.8 6.3 31.6 46.3
15 17.3 12.6 24.4 26.8 18.9
16 12.5 8.6 37.5 23.1 16.4 1.9
17 8.2 2.1 25.8 37.1 19.6 3.1 4.1
Table D.3: Education background at the moment of entering in AFAM.
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All Under-19 Under-19 (CCT)⇤
Age (reference:12-13)
14-15 10.308*** 9.148*** 6.814***
[1.690] [0.900] [2.445]
16-17 10.032*** 9.013*** 9.584***
[1.716] [0.938] [2.533]
18-19 15.080*** 10.804*** 14.615***
[1.828] [1.081] [3.290]
20 or more 19.031***
[1.531]
Sex (1=Male) -21.199*** -5.332*** -6.896***
[0.503] [0.637] [1.817]
Region (1=Capital city) -1.300** 1.399* 3952
[0.525] [0.781] [2.696]
Employee (1=Yes) -5.613*** -2.572** -6.432*
[0.540] [1.066] [3.560]
Attendance (1=Yes. 0=No) -5.550*** -3.634*** -5.395**
[0.962] [0.876] [2.708]
O↵spring (1=Yes) 12.995*** 45.903*** 36.838***
[0.634] [1.910] [5.805]
Household Income/100 -0.001 -0.001 0.007
[0.002] [0.003] [0.043]
Constant 16.145*** 6.276*** 8.971**
[1.521] [1.136] [3.691]
N 9387 1481 196
R-square 0.3061 0.4541 0.4465
⇤ Those who applied to the CCT programs (treated and control)
Table D.4: Home production: OLS.
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Dependent variable: wage (15-18 years) OLS Heckman Selection eq. Pr(work=1)
(1) (2) (3)
Age 0.063 0.155 0.224***
[0.105] [0.195] [0.038]
Attendance (1=Yes) -0.030 -0.339 -0.719***
[0.262] [0.612] [0.092]
Education (Ref: Primary)
High School (compulsory) -0.460* -0.448* 0.022
[0.245] [0.245] [0.099]
High School (not compulsory) -0.856** -0.918** -0.153
[0.378] [0.392] [0.136]
Home Production (Ref: HP=0)
0-10 0.742** 0.719* -0.062
[0.379] [0.379] [0.133]
> 10 0.813** 0.740** -0.122
[0.336] [0.358] [0.120]
Treat (1=Yes) 0.272 0.271 0.013
[0.220] [0.219] [0.082]
2nd Wave (1=Yes) 0.337 0.336 -0.012
[0.207] [0.206] [0.077]
O↵spring (1=Yes) -0.713***
[0.181]
Constant 1.465 -0.640 -4.094***
[1.720] [4.149] [0.636]
Mills 0.553
[0.992]
N 302 1568
R-sq 0.064
Table D.5: Wage equation.
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Dependent variable: GPA Age
12-18 12-14 15-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GPA t-1 (ref: F)
B 0.645*** 0.631*** 0.883*** 0.866*** 0.069 0.058
[0.101] [0.102] [0.122] [0.124] [0.201] [0.203]
A 1.720*** 1.685*** 1.892*** 1.863*** 1.784*** 1.738***
[0.183] [0.184] [0.209] [0.209] [0.497] [0.497]
Grade (ref:1-2)
3-4 0.192 0.212 0.362** 0.385** 0.018 0.019
[0.138] [0.139] [0.184] [0.185] [0.222] [0.225]
5-6 -0.384 -0.373 -1.063*** -1.045***
[0.3220] [0.321] [0.357] [0.359]
Sex (1=Male) -0.219 -0.192 -0.140
[0.134] [0.186] [0.206]
Age -0.127** -0.128** -0.257*** -0.259*** 0.169 0.149
[0.056] [0.057] [0.091] [0.094] [0.114] [0.114]
Home Production (Ref: HP=0)
0-10 0.097 -0.047 0.121 -0.008 0.032 -0.029
[0.102] [0.143] [0.114] [0.187] [0.313] [0.321]
> 10 0.077 -0.009 0.084 -0.119 0.166 0.104
[0.162] [0.185] [0.328] [0.386] [0.276] [0.286]
Region (1=Capital city) -0.197 -0.296 -0.013
[0.149] [0.207] [0.201]
Treat (1=Yes) 0.119 0.130 0.194 0.206 0.046 0.051
[0.107] [0.107] [0.127] [0.128] [0.199] [0.204]
2nd Wave (1=Yes) -0.156* -0.187* -0.114
[0.095] [0.128] [0.184]
Hours Worked (Ref: HW=0)
0-15 0.464 0.527
[0.673] [0.684]
> 15 -0.208 -0.133
[0.347] [0.384]
⌫1 -1.827 -2.117 -4.015 -3.682 2.508 2.021
[0.736] [0.744] [1.273] [1.208] [1.866] [1.870]
⌫2 -0.203 -0.479 -2.21 -1.868 3.866 3.384
[0.732] [0.741] [1.266] [1.204] [1.873] [1.878]
N 623 623 454 454 169 169
Pseudo R-sq 0.147 0.153 0.166 0.174 0.091 0.094
Table D.6: GPA: ordered probit.
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Figure D.1: Leisure value by hours of leisure.
PANES treated PANES control
0-10 hours >10 hours 0-10 hours >10 hours
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12-13 0.510 0.402 0.054 0.172 0.431 0.362 0.137 0.189
14-15 0.620 0.334 0.358 0.327 0.568 0.347 0.417 0.332
16-17 0.481 0.299 0.390 0.410 0.489 0.326 0.420 0.450
AFAM treated AFAM control
0-10 hours >10 hours 0-10 hours >10 hours
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
12-13 0.507 0.412 0.075 0.156 0.581 0.401 0.071 0.165
14-15 0.599 0.354 0.316 0.311 0.539 0.365 0.395 0.333
16-17 0.531 0.312 0.466 0.408 0.495 0.334 0.505 0.458
Table D.8: Model fit: home production.
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Figure D.2: Home production value by age.
PANES treated PANES control
0-15 hours >15 hours 0-15 hours >15 hours
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
14-15 0.051 0.096 0.036 0.062 0.015 0.086 0.020 0.042
16-17 0.076 0.032 0.116 0.225 0.070 0.025 0.134 0.152
AFAM treated AFAM control
0-15 hours >15 hours 0-15 hours >15 hours
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
14-15 0.021 0.078 0.021 0.054 0.017 0.078 0.029 0.028
16-17 0.045 0.018 0.149 0.218 0.042 0.018 0.151 0.132
Table D.9: Model fit: Work hours.
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Figure D.3: School attendance value by GPA and grade achievement.
F B A
Data Model Data Model Data Model
12 0.15 0.145 0.44 0.513 0.41 0.342
13 0.25 0.229 0.52 0.499 0.23 0.272
14 0.31 0.418 0.48 0.399 0.21 0.184
15 0.39 0.393 0.40 0.419 0.21 0.188
16 0.55 0.546 0.34 0.342 0.11 0.112
17 0.57 0.587 0.30 0.306 0.13 0.106
Table D.10: Model fit: Grades by age.
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Figure D.4: Value at the age 18.
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Chapter 3
Social security schemes and labor
supply in the formal and informal
sectors
3.1 Introduction
Informality defined as the lack of social security contributions is one of the main charac-
teristics of the labor markets in developing countries. This feature not only has an impact
on the current situation of the workers not receiving benefits such as health insurance,
unemployment insurance or extra payments, but it also a↵ects access to the pension sys-
tem for the elderly. This paper discusses the impact of retirement scheme changes
on the labor path between informality and formality and the pension achieve-
ment. I will explore the changes in the main variables of the current system,
that is: i) number of years of contributing to the system; and ii) the minimum
age, which are both requirements to obtain a pension. Furthermore, this paper
deals with the reform of the pension system, from a mixed system where two pillars co-
exist: a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and an individual capitalization system to a new
system with only one of those pillars. In order to summarize the di↵erent systems I take
the rate of replacement as the main characteristic of each scheme, and the di↵erent types
of pensions (full, advanced age or survival) into consideration.
Over the last few decades, in many developing countries several reforms in the pension
scheme have been implemented, aiming to cover the increasing deficit of the public budget
triggered by the advance of demographic transition. In South America, in 1975, there were
12.8 working age people (15-64) per each old individual (65 or more); this number fell to
11.4 in 2000 and the estimation for the few next years is an important fall, estimated to
be 6.7 for 2025 and 3.7 for 2050 (United-Nations (1999)). This pattern is caused not only
by the rise in the life expectancy and survival rates, but also by the fall in birth rates.
94
Chapter 3. Social security schemes and labor supply in the formal and informal
sectors
Argentina is a special and interesting case because, on the one hand, it is in an advanced
stage of demographic transition reaching the same levels as developed countries1 and,
on the other, the system has been the subject of several reforms in the last 20 years.
The reform which was established in 1993, transformed a public PAYG with persistent
and increasing deficits into a mixed system (PAYG and individual capitalization) in the
retirement program in which private and public institutions coexist. This reform was
triggered by the need to make the system sustainable. This reform and its consequences
were studied in depth by the academia and discussed in the political environments during
the last decade, and finally it was reformed in December 2008 to return only to a publicly
funded PAYG system2. Despite this reform, the requirements to access a pension are still
relatively strict in comparison with the region. However, the government carried out a
Moratorium in an attempt to drive the universal pension’s coverage.
This Moratorium was introduced in 2007 as part of the Pension Inclusion Program3
to include mainly women and self employed workers who have eligibility di culties in the
pension system (Bosch and Guajardo (2012), Bosch and Manacorda (2012)). In these
papers the Moratorium has no e↵ect given that self employed men and women are no
included in the estimation, the former because of the lack of measurement through the
household survey and the latter because their situation has many ingredients such as
fertility and home production which are not included here.
Country Mean Male Female
Uruguay 20.3 13.0 17.7
Chile 23.6 16.6 24.6
Argentina 36.1 27.0 35.5
Colombia 42.7 36.6 38.4
Ecuador 52.0 48.2 45.3
Mexico 55.5 50.5 47.0
Source: CEDLAS
Table 3.1: Informality (lack of pension rights) among salaried workers in LatinAmerica
(2009).
Additionally, pension achievement has been in the academic and political discussion in
the last two decades. The work record allows the agencies to properly enforce the require-
1As is shown in the Figure E.1, Argentina has an advanced stage of demographic transition even in the
middle of the past century, and in the projection for 2015 is much closer to the high income countries.
2This reform was motivated in part due to the financial crisis after September 2008.
3The details can be seen in Arza (2009).
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ments to achieve the pension, by checking the years in formality (contribution history).
At the same time, those workers who either enter and exit from the formality repeatedly
or are in informality for many years have great di culties in achieving a pension. These
workers in the past, even when they did not meet the requirements, were able to easily
cheat the agencies through (false) witnesses4. Recently in the region5, there have been
some reforms to relax the requirements (reducing the years of contribution, computing, in
the case of women, the number of o↵spring as years of contribution).
The Argentinean program severely punishes short contribution careers in comparison
with other countries of the region (Forteza and Ourens (2009)). Conversely, the program
also has a wide promotion of extraordinary programs to allow access to specials pensions,
for those who do not have enough years to have the right to either the full or the advanced
age pensions. Additionally, there has also been an increment in the level of the minimal
pension in the last few years (Rofman et al. (2010)). These changes have led to the
idea that the pension system is an essential factor in the formality path, because the
workers can believe that even if they are in the informality, the government commitment
to maintaining some requirement to access a pension will be relaxed (Forteza et al. (2009)).
Moreover, if the requirements to access a pension are too strict and only a small share of
the population can enjoy it, the government will be forced either to change the rules or to
create new types of pensions.
Holzmann and Takayama (2009) focus on the specific e↵ect of some social transfers
such as non-contributory pension in the great mobility between formality and informality.
Latin America is one of the regions where informality has been studied in depth. About
50% of salaried workers are employed informally, informal workers being defined as those
who are not covered by labor regulations, such as taxes, right to the health system and
right to pension income in retirement age (Portes et al. (1989), Schneider (2012)). In
this research informal workers are identified as those who declare that their
employer is not paying the necessary contribution to have the right to a pension
in old age.
It is relevant to analyze the nature of the informality, in the past the existence of
two segmented markets was a common assumption. These markets, formal and informal,
4Note the practices are not viewed as a crime in many countries neither by the citizens nor the govern-
ment.
5For example, in Uruguay, Chile or Colombia
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Country Low education Medium education High education
Uruguay 27.0 11.0 3.3
Chile 31.8 18.6 12.6
Argentina 51.6 32.0 14.4
Colombia 62.9 30.1 8.2
Ecuador 74.9 47.5 21.6
Mexico 73.9 43,6 24.6
Source: CEDLAS
Table 3.2: Informality Rates Among Salaried Workers by schooling level in 2009.
have di↵erent rules which were associated with a high and a low productivity sector re-
spectively. This concept has been discussed by the empirical literature using data from
Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and Uruguay6, where the empirical evidence goes towards
the idea that the workers decide where to be, the workers decide which sector to be in
based on their characteristics. A third idea proposes a moderate dualism, which is con-
sidered in most of the recent theoretical papers7. In my paper, I model this moderate
dualism through a partial equilibrium model in which the workers decide to work either
formally or informally, but being in each sector not only has a di↵erent wage function,
but also the cost to entry, the cost to change and the probabilities of losing the job are
di↵erent. This idea is a fundamental concept in this paper.
In the tradition of discrete choice models, Keane and Wolpin (1997) developed a semi-
nal model which provided an estimation of the decision between home production, school-
ing, and occupational choice. Following this model, Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)
developed and estimated a model of labor supply and consumption in low income house-
holds with individuals in their fifties. In this model, the individual decides whether to
work full or part time or not work at all, subject to the social security rules, limited
borrowing, bequests, uncertain health and death. They analyzed single and married in-
dividuals separately, and found a lower response among married individuals when social
security benefits are reduced by 25%, a reduction in labor supply for individuals below 62
and an increase of total hours for the individual over this age.
Furthermore, Bailey Jones and French (2010) estimate a retirement dynamic model
which includes the decision of savings and medical expenses, with special attention paid
to the di↵erent systems of medical expenses and the role of health insurance. They point
6Magnac (1991), Maloney (2004), Pratap and Quintin (2006) and Bucheli and Ceni (2010).
7In the Chapter 1 of this Thesis and in Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007), Amaral and Quintin (2006).
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out the relevance of Medicare eligibility in the labor decisions for individuals older than
60 years.
Labor supply behavior in the context of informality has been analyzed in some recent
papers, Todd and Velez-Grajales (2008) and Joubert (2012) assess the behavior of individ-
uals among the covered and uncovered sectors8 for Chile, changing the rules of the pension
system. Theoretically, the main di↵erences between these papers and my paper is the def-
inition of informal workers that they are using. They consider as covered (formal) workers
those who have a contract, while the uncovered are those who do not have a contract and
self employed workers. Additionally, Todd and Velez-Grajales (2008) estimate the model
only with men and Joubert (2012) works with couples as a decision unit and he allows
for savings in the model. Finally Otero (2013), using data for Chile, analyses the pension
system changes in the formality performance with asymmetric intra household bargaining
power.
With respect to these last papers, I consider the pension system as a general provision
system and not only as a saving system. This allows me to manage di↵erent pension
schemes and compare them. From an empirical point of view, they are using data for Chile
where the rate of uncovered workers is significantly lower than in Argentina. Furthermore,
the recent reform in Argentina is an interesting point to study, because the economic
volatility gives the role of saving which has a lot of obstacles in the traditional way, to the
pension system.
An intertemporal utility maximization model for Brazil using a pseudo-panel is esti-
mated by Robalino (2009). The individual decides where to work and how much to save
given a set of social policies. This research has many shortcomings, the main one being the
estimation using a pseudo-panel that triggers higher measurement errors. Finally, they do
not take data about wages into account nor do they model the longitudinal transition of
the workers.
My paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some facts from the data to
contextualize the topic, Section 3 provides the main features of the Argentinean pension
system, Section 4 provides the data which is used in the estimation, Section 5 presents
the structural model, Section 6 presents the main results of the estimation, Section 7 the
policy experiments, and finally, Section 8 contains the main conclusions.
8Covered workers are those who have a written contract. This definition tries to capture some measure
of the informality.
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3.2 Some facts from the data
Informality is present in all the countries of the region with di↵erent degrees depending
on the level of development and the institutional framework. In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 the level
of informality in six countries in Latin America is shown using the lack of contribution to
achieve a pension in the future as the definition9. We can identify three groups: Argentina
is in the middle one with more than 35% of the salaried workers in informality. These
di↵erences are due to the general development level of the countries and the institutional
framework such as the quality of the benefits or the level of government enforcement10.
However, this problem is also present with relevant figures in the most advanced countries
of the region: Chile and Uruguay11. In the countries with lower informality, there are
greater di↵erences between women and men than in countries with higher levels (Table
3.1). Furthermore, di↵erences between educative levels is a feature which is present in all
the countries (Table 3.2).
In order to analyze the mobility behavior among formality, informality and unemploy-
ment, I perform a multinomial logit with Argentinean data from the period 1995-2008. In
Table 3.3 we can observe that the marginal e↵ects, the age, the education and the tenure
have a positive e↵ect on formality and a negative one on informality. Being married and
being the head of the household has a positive e↵ect of being formal and a negative of
being informal, meanwhile being single has a negative e↵ect in both sectors. Being for-
mal in the previous period has a relevant e↵ect on remaining in formality in the current
period. It is easier to enter in formality from unemployment than informality relative to
being informal in t  1, and it is easier to lose an informal job than a formal one.
Based on the multinomial logit model, I predict the distribution in each sector by
education, age and marital status. Firstly, the distribution by education is clear, the
prediction shows that formality is increasing and informality and unemployment are de-
creasing by education level, as is shown in Table 3.4. The probability of being unemployed
in the lower level of education (incomplete high school) is double in the highest one (col-
lege complete). Comparing the highest education with the lowest one, the probability of
9Similar figures can be observed when other definitions such as heath insurance or paid holidays are
taken into consideration.
10These features are treated and discussed deeply in Chapter 1 of this Thesis.
11Chile leads almost all the rankings about economic performance and economic development in Latin
America.
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Marginal e↵ects 1995-2008
Unemployed Formal Informal
Unemployed(-1) 0.0748⇤⇤⇤ 0.0466⇤⇤⇤  0.1215⇤⇤⇤
(0.0015) (0.0032) (0.003)
Formal (-1)  0.0184⇤⇤⇤ 0.3322⇤⇤⇤  0.3138⇤⇤⇤
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Age 0.0012⇤⇤⇤ 0.0004⇤⇤⇤  0.0016⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Education  0.0036⇤⇤⇤ 0.0706⇤⇤⇤  0.067⇤⇤⇤
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Married  0.0095⇤⇤⇤ 0.0273⇤⇤⇤  0.0178⇤⇤⇤
(0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0049)
Single 0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.0153⇤⇤⇤  0.0068
(0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0056)
Head  0.0213⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤  0.0217⇤⇤⇤
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Tenure  0.0350⇤⇤⇤ 0.0539⇤⇤⇤  0.0189⇤⇤⇤
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Standard Errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.10, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
Table 3.3: Marginal e↵ects based on the multinomial model (only men).
being formal is two times higher and the probability of being informal is four times lower.
The change in the probabilities when the workers achieve a college degree is remarkable12.
The probability of being unemployed decreases by more than 4 points, the probability of
being formal increases by almost 20 points and being informal decreases by more than 15
points.
The data for age groups shows that the probabilities for the unemployed decreases
until the fifties and then increases, the formality has the opposite behavior, increasing and
then slightly decreasing. Meanwhile, informality decreases with age but the percentage
remains stable after the age of 45. Being formal is 20 points more probable for those
over 35 years old than the workers in their twenties, and being informal is 15 points less
probable. Regarding the distribution by marital status, the single people have double the
probability of being unemployed or 50% higher probability of being informal than those
who are married or divorced. In general, the characteristics of formality, informality and
unemployment are in line with the literature (Loayza et al. (2009), Hazans (2011))
12Medium education means completed high-school and high education completed college.
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Distribution in each sector 1995-2008
Education Unemployed Formal Informal
Low Education 0.1137 0.4796 0.4067
Medium Education 0.0861 0.6594 0.2545
High Education 0.0423 0.8578 0.0999
Age group Unemployed Formal Informal
23-28 0.1143 0.5157 0.3700
29-34 0.0767 0.6350 0.2883
35-44 0.0640 0.7048 0.2312
45-54 0.0652 0.7254 0.2094
55-65 0.0829 0.7091 0.2080
Marital status Unemployed Formal Informal
Married 0.0629 0.6949 0.2422
Divorced-widow 0.0850 0.6372 0.2779
Single 0.1371 0.4875 0.3754
Total 0.0894 0.6211 0.2895
Table 3.4: Distribution in each sector by education, age group and marital status based
in the multinomial model (only men).
The transitions are studied through the multinomial model which was presented before.
Figure E.2 in the Appendix shows the transitions yearly from the formality (first panel),
and the informality (second panel). The formality is the sector where the workers remain
(do not change) more, but those who change go more to other jobs in the informality
rather than to unemployment. In the second panel, 30% of the informal workers annually
change sector; in 2003 there is an equal percentage when workers go to formality and to
unemployment, and in the latest years the major percentage is for those who change to
formality (rather than unemployment).
In Figure E.3, the first panel shows the transition from unemployment and the second
panel shows those workers who do not change from the sector who were working the year
before (the stayers). The unemployed workers tend to change more to informality than
to formality and it is easier for the unemployed to enter in the labor market through the
informal sector13. Formal workers tend to remain in formality more than the informal
workers do in informality and the unemployed in unemployment.
Additionally, these transitions are studied by other dimensions. Table 3.5 shows the
probability of transitions of the active salaried workers. In the first block, in all the
13This feature is also observed if smaller periods are considered, such as quarterly or biannual changes.
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Probability of being in each sector
Unemployed Formal Informal
Unemployed (-1) 0.3797 0.2270 0.3934
Formal (-1) 0.0282 0.8916 0.0802
Informal (-1) 0.1123 0.2140 0.6737
Probability of being unemployed by education and sector of precedence
Education Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3947 0.0417 0.1121
Medium Education 0.3697 0.0266 0.1118
High Education 0.3429 0.0141 0.1154
Probability of being formal by education and sector of precedence
Education Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.1758 0.8362 0.1704
Medium Education 0.2531 0.8984 0.2528
High Education 0.3834 0.9492 0.3920
Probability of being informal by education and sector of precedence
Education Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.4295 0.1221 0.7175
Medium Education 0.3771 0.0751 0.6354
High Education 0.2737 0.0367 0.4926
Table 3.5: Probabilities of being in each sector, based on the multinomial model 1995-2008
(only men).
elements of the principal diagonal, there are the individuals who do not switch annually14.
The rows in the table are the original sector where the workers have been in the previous
year (t   1), and the columns are the current sector (t). It is important to note that the
formality is 20 points more stable than the informality, and about 38% of the unemployed
remain in this condition for two consecutive years. At the same time, the informal sector
appears more unstable than the formal sector, and it is easier to enter from unemployment
(40% instead of 23%), this feature gives some attractiveness to this sector. Additionally,
there are 20% of informal workers who annually move to the formality after, for example,
gaining some experience or escaping from unemployment.
These changes can also be analyzed by the education level. In the second block, we
can observe the transition from unemployment. The stayers in unemployment decrease
slightly by educative levels (40%, 37% and 34% respectively); for those who change to the
formality the percentages are quite low, but anyway the more educated workers have an
14In the whole period 1995-2008.
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almost three times lower probability of losing their job (4.2%, 2.6% and 1.4% from low to
high educative level). In the case of the informal workers, they can lose their job with the
same probability for all educative levels (about 11%).
The third block of Table 3.5, shows the transitions to formality. It is shown that
formality is remarkably more stable in the more educated individuals (10 points higher),
and the educated workers who were in informality can change to the formality with much
more probability than the low educated workers (22 points more). For the unemployed
workers, the percentages are 17.6% for the low educated, 25.3% for the medium educated,
and 38.3% for the higher ones. Formality has fewer barriers to entry for the high educated
than for the other workers.
In the fourth block, the transitions to informality can be observed. Informality is more
stable in the lower educative levels, 71.8% for the low educated and 49.3% for the high ones
(almost 22 points of di↵erence between the higher and the lower ones). The less educated
workers also present more probability to enter to work informally when they used to be
unemployed than those with a high educative level (43% and 27% for the lower and the
higher educative levels respectively). The same pattern is presented for those who came
from formality (12% and 4% for the lower and the higher educative levels respectively).
The distribution of the wages is shown in Figure 3.1 in the Kernel simulations by
educative level. The mean of the wages is always higher in formality than in informality
in the di↵erent levels. However, the informal wages are definitely more volatile (higher
standard deviations) than the formal ones, especially in the higher levels of education.
The share of elderly men who achieve some pension payment is shown in Table 3.6. In
the data in 2001, most men achieved some pension payment after 75 years old. However,
this data is only a photo in 2001 and these workers worked at a time prior to the existence
of working records, and the pension requirements were confirmed only by witnesses. If
we analyze the work histories Forteza et al. (2009) in the pre-2008 pension scheme in
Argentina the simulation shows that only 40% of men would achieve at least 30 years of
contributions. Bosch and Guajardo (2012) show that the share of over 65 with a pension
income decreases between 1992 and 2007 from about 85% to 65% among men. Principally,
those men who have no pension coverage are mainly self-employed.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of wages 1995-2008 by education level
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Coverage of the pension system
65-69 70-74 75+
Contributive 64.18 81.8 84.52
Full pension 60.06 75.99 75.37
Advanced age 3.31 4.95 8.16
Non contributive pension 1.31 2.35 3.87
Table 3.6: Coverage of the pension system (only men). Source: Bertranou (2001)
3.3 The Argentinean background: pension system and sav-
ings
In Argentina, the pension system has changed drastically twice in the last twenty years.
The system changed first in 1994, and a multipillar system based on a PAYG and individual
capitalization was established. The first pillar was a PAYG scheme, which was financed
by employer’s contributions (16% of gross taxable income), and the workers would obtain
a Universal Pension Benefit (UPB) with 30 years of contribution and at 60 or 65 years
old for women and men respectively. The pension payment was a monthly flat amount of
about 28% of the average wage.
The second pillar was financed by employee contributions (11% of gross taxable in-
come), which financed the PAYG or individual capitalization scheme. Private and public
institutions participated in this scheme Rofman (2000). There were also employer and em-
ployee contributions for di↵erent funds to finance redistribution programs and the health
system.
In December 2008, as a consequence of the global financial crisis and after more than
a decade of criticism of the multipillar regime, the scheme changed again, returning to
a single public pillar with a PAYG scheme. The pension is composed of the UPB and
Compensatory Pension (CP), which is included to compensate the elimination of individual
capitalization. This system is financed by current contributions and general taxes. The
employee and employer contributions have not changed, only the administrator of the
resources has changed. In the model estimation, I will consider the period 1995-2008 in
order to capture the first scheme and the period 2008-2011 as the out of sample validation.
In this paper the di↵erent schemes are summarized by the rates of replacement. These
figures were estimated taking the di↵erent schemes into consideration, and given the mul-
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tiplillar scheme was only active for 14 years, there was no possibility to observe an entire
generation in the system during its whole active life.
The severe financial crisis that Argentina su↵ered in 2001 deeply a↵ected saving de-
cisions, because many banks closed and the savers lost a lot of their money. Moreover,
in the last two years many restrictions have been imposed to prevent private access to
foreign currency which has traditionally been the main way for families to save. However,
a pension system is related with the saving decision for the elderly, based on the events of
the last decade I have decided not to take into account saving decisions in the model.
3.4 Data
I use the Permanent Household Survey (EPH in Spanish) carried out by the National
Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC in Spanish) for the period 1995 to 2011. The
sample is restricted to the urban regions, covering 28 large urban centers where 70% of
the urban population of Argentina live15.
Between 1995 and 2002 the survey was biannual16, in 2003 it became quarterly. In the
first period, the panel is rotative losing 25% of the cases every six months. In the second
period, the rotation has the following characteristics: i) two consecutive quarters share
50% of the cases, ii) two quarters with one quarter in the middle, do not have any cases
in common, and iii) two quarters with two quarters in the middle, share 25% of cases.
Any quarter shares 25% of the cases with the same one in consecutive years. In the whole
period it is possible to follow some individuals for one year and a half.
This survey has a socioeconomic purpose and it is crucial in identifying workers in dif-
ferent sectors of the economy. The identification of the formal workers is directly assessed
by asking if the employer pays the social contribution to have the right to access a pension
payment in retirement. Unfortunately, the questionnaire does not ask anything about the
contribution of the self employers. This is the main shortcoming of this survey, so my
research only analyzes the dynamic of the salaried workers. This feature allows me to ana-
lyze the pure transitions from job to job without taking into consideration self-employment
as a possible escape from unemployment.
15Urban population accounts for 90% of the total population of Argentina, so the survey gives a good
representation of the country.
16First and third quarter.
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3.5 Model
The model describes the decision problem of the individual in the subsequent periods
after they leave the education system until they die. In each period the individuals choose
between either working in the formal or informal sector or being unemployed. The indi-
viduals have an endowment of human capital which was acquired in the past and depends
on the years of schooling, and also the experience that they acquire to work in formal and
informal jobs. This latter point means that the employer can not distinguish the sector
where the experience of the workers has been gained. For instance, I assume that a young
individual at 23 years old leaves the education system with a level of formal education
between incomplete elementary school and university degree. They face a finite horizon
decision and choose among the di↵erent options that they have as in the seminal paper of
Keane and Wolpin (1997).
The worker’s life is classified in three stages as is shown in Figure 3.2, the first one
is the pure active life, where the worker can either work in formality or informality, or
be unemployed. The second stage, is the elective retirement stage where those workers
who are eligible for retirement can choose to retire, and those who are not eligible continue
as in the pure active life stage. The third and final stage is the compulsory retirement
stage where everyone is in retirement even if they are not eligible for a pension. In this
last stage, everyone receives a pension.
Figure 3.2: Timeline of the individual in the model
Firstly, Equation (3.1) shows the state space, that is: the age (a) which determines the
stage of the worker’s life; the education level (S) which introduces initial heterogeneity to
the individuals, the experience in the labor market (X) which is gained if the individuals
are working either in formality or informality, the number of years in formality which is
accumulated with the experience in the formal sector (aF ) giving the insight to achieve
107
Chapter 3. Social security schemes and labor supply in the formal and informal
sectors
one of the requirements to access pension rights, the sector where the individual was in the
previous period (It 1k ) which determines the type of benefit to enjoy (i.e. the unemploy-
ment insurance if they choose unemployment after being formal), and the cost of entry to
the formal sector (i.e. the cost from unemployment is higher than from informality), and
a random shock in wages (✏(a)j).
⌦(t) =
h
a, S,X, aF , I
t 1
k , ✏(a)
j
i
k =
⇢
Formal (F), Informal (I),Unemployed (U)
 
j =
⇢
Formal (F), Informal (I)
  (3.1)
There is a Mincer equation of working in each sector in Equation (3.2) where the reward
depends on the education (S) and the experience (X) gained working (both in formality
and informality), and benefits B1(S) in formal workers. Both formal and informal wages
are hit by an idiosyncratic shock (✏f and ✏i).
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The reward of being unemployed is determined by the fact that the worker has the
right to enjoy unemployment insurance or not, as is shown in Equation (3.3). If the worker
works in formality in t, then the worker can enjoy the insurance in t+1, which is fixed as
a percentage (b2) of the previous wage, and they also enjoy B2(X,S) which reflects leisure
or home production.
RU (a,X, S) =
(
b2E
⇥
RF (a  1)⇤+B2(X,S) if I 1F = 1 with 0  b2  1
B2(X,S) otherwise
(3.3)
The functional form of the home production-leisure function increases with education
and decreases with experience in the job market as in Equation 3.4. The parameters b21
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and b23 depend on the educational achievement.
B2(X,S) = b21(S)
✓
b22 +
b23(S)
X
◆
(3.4)
The first stage of analysis is the pure active life until age A1, the individual de-
cides taking not only the current and the future value function, but also the transition
probabilities into account. The transition probabilities are defined as  f (S), which is the
probability of formal job destruction (formality ! unemployment),  i(S), which is the
probability of informal job destruction (informality! unemployment),  F (S) (unemploy-
ment !formal) which is the probability of finding a job in the formal sector, and  I(S)
(unemployment ! informal) which is the probability of finding a job in the informal sec-
tor. The value function V j in Equation (3.5) is the maximum among the value of being
employed in the sector j, and V U which is the value of being unemployed.
Equation (3.6) shows the value function of working in formality V F (informally V I)
is defined with the formal (informal) Mincer equation, the cost of entering each sector,
the cost of switching sectors and the expectation of the future depends on the probability 
1  k(S)
 
of being employed and the future realization of the wages, that is the expected
discounted value of all the years of the first stage (pure active life), plus the value function
of the second and the third stage. The cost of entering and switching sectors depends on
the sector of the previous and the current period (see Equation 3.8).
V
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(3.6)
The cost of entry in formality (Equation 3.7) depends on the educational endow-
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ment(S), the age (a), where the worker was in the previous period (I k i.e. working
informally or unemployed) and a set of parameters (⇧, 11(S), 12(S)). The cost of entry
in informality is fixed at zero.
CFj(a, S, I k) =
8><>:
(⇧  a) 11(S) if I k = informal
(⇧  a) 12(S) if I k = unemployed
0 if I k = formal
k =
 
Formal (F), Informal (I),Unemployed (U)
 (3.7)
I k =
(
1 if the individual being in  k in the previous period
0 otherwise
(3.8)
The value function for the unemployed worker depends on the current utility function,
which is di↵erent if in the previous period the workers were in formality or in informality,
and the expected utility function, as is shown in Equation 3.9.
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(3.9)
The utility function takes a general form, Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
as in Equation 3.10:
U
✓
Rk(a)
◆
=
1
1   R
k(a)
1
1   (3.10)
The second stage of analysis is between A1 and A2, A1 is the lower age that the
workers can choose to retire and at A2 everyone is retired. In this period the individuals
can choose to continue to work in both sectors or be unemployed, but those individuals
who achieve the minimum years in formality (F1) may get a full pension, so they could
be retired and also enjoy B3(S) as pensioner’s home production-leisure as in Equations
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3.11 and 3.13. Otherwise, the pension could be achievable in this period when aF (total
of years worked in formality) achieve at least the threshold F1. Note, as Equation 3.12
shows the pension is always a choice in this stage of the workers life. Additionally, there
are three full pensions which depend on aF , if the workers decide to continue working,
they can achieve a higher rate of replacement in the future, but their life is limited to A
when everyone is dead.
V P
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◆
= U
✓
rFR
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◆
+  E⌦(a+1)/⌦(a)V
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(3.12)
The home production leisure function (Equation 3.13) for the pensioners depends only
on educational achievement and it is constant during the retirement period.
B3(S) = b31(S) (3.13)
The individuals who achieve the full pension are those who work in formality for 30
years or more:
IaF 30 =
(
1 if the individual has worked in formality for 30 years or more
0 otherwise
(3.14)
The third stage of analysis starts at A2 years old when all the individuals are retired.
The value function of these pensioners is shown in Equation 3.15 and is determined by
the income that the individual would receive and the number of years in formality (F1
and F2). It is determined by the replacement rate and the last wage received in the active
life. There would be three types of pensions: the full, the Advanced age and the survival
pension. At the age of A everyone is dead.
V
✓
⌦(a)
◆
= U
✓
rFR
k(a) +B3(S)
◆
IaF 30 + U
✓
rAR
k(a) +B3(S)
◆
I30>aF 10
+ U
✓
b3 +B3(S)
◆
IaF<10 +  E⌦(a+1)/⌦(a)V
✓
⌦(a+ 1)
◆ (3.15)
The individuals who achieve the Advanced age pension are those who work between
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10 and 30 years in formality during their whole working life:
I30>aF 10 =
(
1 if they have worked in formality for 10 years or more and less than 30
0 otherwise
(3.16)
The rate of replacement (rF ) in the full pension type is not unique, it increases in the
number of years that the workers one in formality. In the estimation I will consider three
rates, at 30 (aF 30), 35 (aF 35) and 40 (aF 40) years in formality.
3.6 Estimation
I estimate the parameters of model using the Simulated Methods of Moments (SMM),
through the maximization of the value function conditional on the state variables mini-
mizing the distance between the simulated moments in the model and the moments in the
data, weighing with the inverse of the simulated variance of the moments. I select mo-
ments to match the choices along the working career and the educational endowment and
the transition between states, to estimate the discount factor  , the shape of the utility
function  , the parameters that determine the home production-leisure function, the pa-
rameters to enter into formality from informality and unemployment and the idiosyncratic
shocks.
In Table 3.7 I show the estimation of the Mincer equation for the formal and informal
workers, each worker based on their educational endowment and the experience that they
achieve in the labor market, receives a wage o↵er which forms part of their utility function
and decides either to work or to remain unemployed. Education and experience are better
rewarded for the formal workers than for the informal ones. However, the informal workers
receive better o↵ers in their youth (the constant term is higher). The standard deviation
of the idiosyncratic shocks in the wages is estimated by MSM and is shown in Table 3.8,
informal shocks have a higher deviation than formal ones.
The transition function ( j and  j) parameters (education endowment and experience
achieved) are estimated through the marginal e↵ect of the multinomial function shown in
Table 3.3.
The parameters estimated by SMM are shown in Table 3.8. In the first block are the
general parameters of the model, the discount factor which is in line with the literature,
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Coe cients estimated from the Mincer equations
Name Symbol Value Standard deviation
Constant formal ↵f0 0.2606 (0.0227 )
Constant informal ↵i0 0.3962 (0.0805 )
Schooling formal ↵f1 0.2982 (0.0027 )
Schooling informal ↵i1 0.2707 (0.0056 )
Experience formal ↵f2 0.1622 (0.0035 )
Experience informal ↵i2 0.0979 (0.0057 )
Experience2 formal ↵f3 -0.0117 (0.0004 )
Experience2 informal ↵i3 -0.0077 (0.0007 )
Table 3.7: Parameters of the Mincer equation.
is close to 0.95 and the risk aversion is 1.28 which is a bit lower than in the literature17.
The second block shows the parameters of the extra-wage benefits that the formal workers
enjoy, which is fixed at zero for those in the lower educative level. In the third block,
there are the home production-leisure parameters in active and in the fourth one, the
parameters in retirement. The parameters of the home production-leisure are higher for
the more educated, reflecting the outside option of the wage. In the fifth block, there are
the parameters of the cost to enter into formality, the low educated have a higher cost
than the higher educated individuals.
Some parameters are calibrated in Table 3.9. The minimum retirement age is 65 years
old as the minimum age to achieve the full pension and 70 years old is the age to achieve
the Advanced age pension. Additionally, to achieve the full pension the workers have to
work at least 30 years in formality and 10 years to get the Advanced age pension. The full
pension has three levels with three di↵erent rates of replacement at 30, 35 and 40 years
in formality with 1.13, 0.96 and 0.81 being the rates of replacement respectively. The
Advanced age pension is at 70% of the full pension with 30 years of formality. Everyone
is dead at 81 years old.
In Table 3.10 there is the estimation for all education levels, the model fits well if the
interval is considered. The model has more problems at the beginning and at the end in
the career, and especially between formal and informal workers, with an overestimation of
17For instance, Joubert (2012) find 1.55 for Chile.
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Parameters estimated by Simulated Method of Moments
Name Symbol Value Standard Deviation
Discount factor   0.9475 (0.0014 )
Risk aversion   1.2757 (0.0018 )
Benefits B1(S)
Medium Education B1(2) 0.4691 (0.0004 )
High Education B1(3) 0.9382 (0.0002 )
Home production in active life B2(XX,S)
Constant b22 100.9925 (5.589 )
Low Education b21(1) 38.1481 (0.781 )
Medium Education b21(2) 36.9016 (1.631 )
High Education b21(3) 49.5058 (2.396 )
Low Education b23(1) 43.465 (1.090 )
Medium Education b23(2) 51.5392 (0.925 )
High Education b23(3) 57.3335 (2.557 )
Home production in retirement life B3(S)
Survival pension b3 1838.1 (2.0 )
Low Education b31(1) 1060.395 (1.87 )
Medium Education b31(2) 3182.1625 (48.91 )
High Education b31(3) 2113.5710 (112.4 )
Cost of entering in formality
Age multiplier ⇧ 97.6199 (4.09 )
Informal-Formal (Low Education)  11(1) 1.18 (0.0141 )
Informal-Formal (Medium Education)  11(2) 0.591 (0.0 )
Informal-Formal (High Education)  11(3) 0.0004 (0.0 )
Unemployed-Formal (Low Education)  12(1) 45.044 (1.22 )
Unemployed-Formal (Medium Education)  12(2) 4.504 (0.12 )
Unemployed-Formal (High Education)  12(3) 0.015 (0.0 )
Shocks
Std Variation informal  i 0.3602 (0.00 )
Std Variation formal  f 0.2109 (0.00 )
Table 3.8: Parameters estimated by Simulated Method of Moments.
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Parameters calibrated
Name Symbol Value
Thresholds
Minimum full retirement age A1 65
Advanced age retirement age A2 70
Death A 80
Years in formality to achieve full pension F1 30
Years in formality to achieve advanced age retirement F2 10
Rates of replacement
Full pension (40 years of formality) rF 40 1.13
Full pension (35 years of formality) rF 35 0.96
Full pension (30 years of formality) rF 30 0.81
Advanced age pension rA 0.7*rF 30
Unemployment benefits for former formal workers b2 0.6
Table 3.9: Parameters calibrated. Source: Forteza and Ourens (2009), Rofman et al.
(2010) .
informality in youth and an underestimation close to retirement.
In Table 3.11 the moment matching of the formal activity is shown. The model matches
quite well taking into consideration the interval, especially the high educated and the
general estimation. However, in the case of the low educated and the medium educated
there is an underestimation (more than 10 points) at the beginning and an overestimation
(also 10 points) in the last years of the career.
In Table 3.12 the moment matching is considered comparing the informal activity. In
this case the model behavior is the other side of the coin, the estimation is again quite
good in the general case and in the medium educated workers, and in this case the high
educated group is mostly in the interval, but there is an overestimation of the low educated
group. The model matching for the unemployed workers is the residual and it is presented
in Table E.3.
In Table 3.13, there is the model matching of the transitions. Here the model behavior
is also quite good, because the formal workers tend to stay in this sector more than
the informal and the unemployed ones. Informality is an easier sector to enter from
unemployment than formality. However, the transition from unemployment to informality
is underestimated.
In this benchmark case the initial heterogeneity of the model, only the education en-
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Formal Informal Unemployed
Data Model Data Model Data Model
23-28 0.5311 0.3993 0.3615 0.5112 0.1074 0.0895
[0.5073, 0.5482] [0.3400, 0.3841] [0.0962, 0.1163]
29-34 0.6286 0.6194 0.3091 0.3505 0.0623 0.0301
[0.5979, 0.6534] [0.2768, 0.3415] [0.0510, 0.0722]
35-44 0.7418 0.7564 0.2107 0.2256 0.0475 0.0180
[0.7148, 0.7621] [0.1958, 0.2295] [0.0398, 0.0574]
45-54 0.7104 0.7466 0.2218 0.1947 0.0678 0.0588
[0.6870, 0.7277] [0.2143, 0.2299] [0.0507, 0.0943]
55+ 0.7127 0.8314 0.2067 0.0836 0.0807 0.0849
[0.6882, 0.7374] [0.1890, 0.2359] [0.0603, 0.1100]
Table 3.10: Moment matching: Formal, informal and unemployed workers at all edu-
cational levels. The interval is estimated based on the multinomial model, performing
bootstraps and considering the middle 90%.
Low Education Medium Education High Education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
23-28 0.4048 0.2654 0.6001 0.4811 0.6754 0.6150
[0.3628, 0.4356 ] [0.5863, 0.6154] [0.6310, 0.7167]
29-34 0.4788 0.5115 0.7061 0.6917 0.8839 0.7783
[0.4429, 0.5081] [0.6682, 0.7324] [0.8492, 0.9187]
35-44 0.5959 0.6514 0.8474 0.8515 0.9186 0.8538
[0.5739, 0.6185] [0.8018, 0.8833] [0.9041, 0.9315]
45-54 0.5761 0.5440 0.8594 0.9432 0.9290 0.9037
[0.5088, 0.6290] [0.8119, 0.8955] [0.9049, 0.9468]
55+ 0.6620 0.7644 0.7081 0.8753 0.9584 0.9327
[0.6209, 0.6964] [0.6491, 0.7931] [0.9364, 0.9779]
Table 3.11: Moment matching: Formal workers. The interval is estimated based on the
multinomial model, performing bootstraps and considering the middle 90%.
Low Education Medium Education High Education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
23-28 0.4490 0.6485 0.3169 0.4149 0.2438 0.3189
[0.4045, 0.4932] [0.3004, 0.3324] [0.1973, 0.2876]
29-34 0.4367 0.4523 0.2412 0.2757 0.0988 0.2161
[0.4066, 0.4743] [0.2054, 0.2817] [0.0720, 0.1136]
35-44 0.3313 0.3145 0.1216 0.1453 0.0688 0.1428
[0.3142, 0.3486] [0.0882, 0.1544] [0.0554, 0.0797]
45-54 0.3187 0.3469 0.1186 0.0537 0.0549 0.0608
[0.3003, 0.3379] [0.0852, 0.1564] [0.0376, 0.0767]
55+ 0.2518 0.1386 0.1875 0.0322 0.0320 0.0365
[0.2236, 0.2852] [0.1468, 0.2383] [0.0147, 0.0495]
Table 3.12: Moment matching: Informal workers. The interval is estimated based on the
multinomial model, performing bootstraps and considering the middle 90%.
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Unemployment Formal Informal
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Unemployed (-1) 0.4414 0.3228 0.1928 0.2593 0.3658 0.4181
[0.3668, 0.5152] [0.1501, 0.2268] [0.3141, 0.4193]
Formal (-1) 0.0295 0.0267 0.8824 0.8347 0.0881 0.1388
[0.0238, 0.0425] [0.8751, 0.8907] [0.0761, 0.0974]
Informal (-1) 0.0743 0.1234 0.2393 0.4755 0.6864 0.4013
[0.0593, 0.1034] [0.2142, 0.2673] [0.6719, 0.7068]
Table 3.13: Moment matching: Transitions. The interval is estimated based on the multi-
nomial model, performing bootstraps and considering the middle 90%.
At 65 and 70 years old Full40 Full35 Full30 Advanced age
Age 65 Age 70 Age 65 Age70
Low Education 0.0% 1.4% 22.9% 44.4% 75.4% 54.2%
Medium Education 0.3% 40.9% 55.3% 58.5% 3.6% 0.3%
High Education 6.2% 56.4% 35.4% 37.3% 2.0 % 0.0%
Table 3.14: Pension achievement.
dowment and the experience achieved, does not allow for the di↵erentiation of individuals.
Pension achievement is shown in Table 3.14, all the workers achieve at least an Ad-
vanced age pension, given that the requirements are very loose, only 10 years of contri-
bution or formality. For the low educated workers almost 54% achieve the Advanced age
pension and 44% the first step of full pension. Note that most of this individuals reach the
pension after the age of 65, then they continue working in order to have this right18. There
is a significant share of medium educated workers who continue to work after 65 in order
to achieve a full pension, and only 0.3% get only the Advanced age pension. At the age of
70, 58% of these workers have the first step of full pension, and 41% and 0.3% the second
and third steps. Most of the high educated workers get the second and third steps of the
full pension. In this estimation, the main problem about the pension achievement is in
the low part of the distribution. Most of the high educated achieve a pension, meanwhile
the low educated have to work until the age of 70 to achieve an Advanced age pension.
This point will be discussed in the policy experiments.
The distribution of the formality path is shown in Table 3.15. The age to start in
formality is lower for higher educated workers, 2 years before, and the average years in
formality is almost double when comparing these groups. Most of the workers prefer
18At age 65 the only pension that they can achieve is the full pension.
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Low Education Medium Education High Education
Age 65 Age 70 Age 65 Age 70 Age 65 Age 70
Mean 24.83 27.32 33.98 34.05 35.46 35.51
Start age 4.16 3.13 2.56
p0.025 14 18 29 30 30 30
p0.125 18 22 31 31 32 32
p0.25 21 25 32 32 33 33
p0.5 25 29 34 34 36 36
p0.75 29 30 36 36 38 38
p0.875 31 31 37 37 39 39
p0.975 34 34 39 39 40 40
Table 3.15: Years in formality.
to retire when they have the possibility, it is clear that for high educated workers the
distribution is the same at 65 and 70 years old. This is not the case for the medium
and low educated workers where the workers about 75% and 25% respectively, continue
working after 65. Informality a↵ects the low educated workers more, as they do not enjoy
the current and the future benefits.
3.7 Policy Experiments
In this section I want to perform some policy experiments in order to analyze di↵erent
situations, which could be probable in di↵erent scenarios. First I will analyze what situ-
ation will be if the rate of replacement was also lower19 (as in a PAYG scheme) and the
age of retirement was lower. Then I make the requirements stricter, and then I perform
changes that could a↵ect the distribution, a↵ecting di↵erentially the low and the high
educated workers..
The first policy experiment is to reduce the rate of replacement that the workers would
get with the full pension20 and the minimum age to get a pension is 60 years old. In Table
3.16 the formality path is shown, there is a decrement of formality at the end of the career.
For the medium educated workers the fall is almost 20 points, and for the low and high
educated workers it is 15 points. Those workers decide to be in unemployment more than
to work.
19In the benchmark calibration I consider the rate of replacement in the case of individual a capitalization
scheme, here I consider the rate of replacement of PAYG.
20The rates of replacement are now 0.8 and 0.7 in the full pension, the Advanced age pension is 70% of
the latter one.
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General Low Education Medium Education High Education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
23-28 0.399 0.404 0.265 0.274 0.481 0.484 0.615 0.618
29-34 0.619 0.616 0.512 0.503 0.692 0.694 0.778 0.777
35-44 0.756 0.745 0.651 0.649 0.852 0.851 0.854 0.853
45-54 0.747 0.755 0.544 0.556 0.943 0.944 0.904 0.918
55+ 0.831 0.677 0.764 0.564 0.875 0.785 0.933 0.770
Table 3.16: Formality path with the first policy experiment: replacement rates and retire-
ment age at 60.
Full35 Full30 Advanced age
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 1.4% 0.0% 44.4% 32.2% 54.2% 67.8%
Medium Education 41.2% 1.3% 58.5% 97.4% 0.3% 1.4%
High Education 62.6% 3.3% 37.3% 96.4% 0.0% 0.3%
Table 3.17: Pension achievement with the first policy experiment: replacement rates and
retirement age at 60.
The pension achievement changes are shown in Table 3.17. The main change is the
rise from about 60% to 97% in the medium educated who achieve the first step of the full
pension. The workers with low education who achieve a full pension is 12 points lower
than in the benchmark, this tendency is confirmed in Table 3.18, which shows that the
years of formality is lower in the low part of the distribution.
The distribution in Table 3.18 shows that the low educated workers work less formally,
especially between the age of 65 and 70. On average, at the age of 70, the low educated
workers have about 2 years less in formality and it is explained principally by the low
part of the distribution. The medium educated workers work less in formality (almost 3.5
years in average at the age of 70), and it is explained principally by the fact that they
prefer to go into retirement as soon as possible, and for this reason the distribution is
more homogeneous in this variable with the policy experiment.
The second policy puts stricter requirements to achieve both the full and Advanced
age pension. The minimum years in formality to achieve them are 35 and 20 respectively.
Table 3.19 shows the pension achievement for the three levels of education. In this scenario,
there are changes principally again for those with low and medium education, in the former
almost 6% do not reach the Advanced age pension and only 17% achieve a full pension.
For the medium educated, there are changes with more workers (7% instead of 0.3%) that
achieve only the Advanced age pension and the first step of the full pension, the second
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Low Education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 24.8 23.9
Years of formality (at 70) 27.3 25.6
Age of start in formality 4.15 4.08
Distribution at age 65 Distribution at age 70
p0.025 14 14 18 15
p0.125 18 17 22 20
p0.25 21 20 25 22
p0.5 25 24 29 27
p0.75 29 29 30 30
p0.875 31 30 31 30
Medium education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 33.9 30.56
Years of formality (at 70) 34.1 30.74
Age that start in formality 3.15 3.13
Distribution at age 65 Distribution at age 70
p0.025 29 28 30 30
p0.125 31 30 31 30
p0.25 32 30 32 30
p0.5 34 30 34 30
p0.75 36 31 36 32
p0.875 37 32 37 32
p0.975 39 34 39 34
Table 3.18: Formality with the first policy experiment: replacement rates and retirement
age at 60.
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Full3 Full2 Full1
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 44.4% 17.8%
Medium Education 0.3% 0.0% 40.9% 1.2% 58.5% 91.7%
High Education 6.2% 0.0% 56.4% 6.5% 37.3% 91.0%
Advanced Age Survival
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 54.2% 75.9% 0.0% 6.3%
Medium Education 0.3% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0%
High Education 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3.19: Pension achievement with the second policy experiment: formality years of
requirement 20 and 35. Full3 pension is 43 and 40 years, Full2 pension is 40 and 35 years
and Full1 pension is 35 and 30 years in the policy and in the benchmark respectively.
and third steps were reached by about 41% and now this percentage is only 1%.
In Table E.4 there is an increment in the formality among individuals over 55 years
old in all educative levels. For the lower and medium educated it is about 7% higher and
for the high educated the di↵erence is 1.5%.
The years in formality is shown in Table 3.20. There are changes in the distribution
around the new thresholds, among the low educated there is a decrease in the low part
of the distribution (18 to 17 in the 2.5 centile ) and an increase in the high part of the
distribution (30 to 33 in the 75 centile and 32 to 35 in the highest part). Additionally,
there are changes for the medium educated, there is an increase in the formality for all
the workers of the distribution, but the change is higher in the low part of the distribution
where most of the workers work formally in order to achieve the new threshold and enjoy
a full pension.
The third policy puts looser requirements to achieve a full pension, only 25 years in
formality. This policy decreases the years of formality for all the educative levels especially
in the last part of the career (over the age of 45) as in shown in Table E.5. The workers
who achieve an Advanced age pension is half that of the benchmark even if they work
less in formality, because this decrement is after 65 then they reach the new minimum
threshold and go into retirement.
For the medium educated workers, there is also a decrement in the years in formality,
half a year lower on average. This happens only in the low part of the distribution but
the medium and high parts of the distribution stay in the same shape as the benchmark.
Finally, the fourth policy is designed to put stricter requirements on the minimum
age to go in retirement, 67 and 72 instead to 65 and 70 for the full and Advance age
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Low Education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 24.8 25.5
Years of formality (at 70) 27.3 28.5
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 18 17
p0.125 22 22
p0.25 25 25
p0.5 29 29
p0.75 30 33
p0.875 32 35
p0.975 35 35
Medium education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 34.0 34.9
Years of formality (at 70) 34.1 35.7
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 29 33
p0.125 31 35
p0.25 32 35
p0.5 34 35
p0.75 36 36
p0.875 37 37
p0.975 38 39
Table 3.20: Formality with the second policy experiment: formality years of requirement
20 and 35.
Full3 Full2 Full1
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.4% 44.4% 76.2%
Medium Education 0.3% 0.2% 40.9% 28.9% 58.5% 71.0%
High Education 6.2% 3.3% 56.4% 51.5% 37.3% 45.5%
Advanced Age Survival
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 54.2% 23.44% 0.0% 0.0%
Medium Education 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
High Education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3.21: Pension achievement with the third policy experiment: formality years of
requirement 25. Full3 pension is 35 and 40 years, Full2 pension is 30 and 35 years and
Full1 pension is 25 and 30 years in the policy and in the benchmark respectively.
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Low Education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 24.8 24.6
Years of formality (at 70) 27.3 25.9
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 18 17
p0.125 22 22
p0.25 25 25
p0.5 29 25
p0.75 30 28
p0.875 31 31
p0.975 34 33
Medium education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65) 34.0 33.3
Years of formality (at 70) 34.1 33.3
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 29 27
p0.125 31 30
p0.25 32 32
p0.5 34 33
p0.75 36 35
p0.875 37 36
p0.975 39 38
Table 3.22: Formality with the third policy experiment: formality years of requirement
25.
pension respectively. This policy experiment is considered to obtain more resources to
cover deficits21. Workers in all educative levels work more formally than in the benchmark
after the age of 45 as is shown in Table E.6. Note for example, that the low educated
work at the age of 67, 2.5 years more in formality than in the benchmark at the age of 65
(Table 3.24).
Pension achievement is shown in Table 3.23, workers in all educative levels achieve
higher pensions due to the fact that they work more formally. However, 42% of the low
educated only achieve an Advance age pension. The distribution of total years in formality
(Table 3.24) is more variable for the low educated than in the benchmark.
21Note if most of the low educated workers continue working after the age of 65, then this requirement
will not a↵ect them. The budget could be a↵ected if more workers have access to a full pension with higher
replacement rates, but those parameters do not deeply a↵ect the worker’s behavior.
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Full3 Full2 Full1
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 7.1% 44.4% 50.8%
Medium Education 0.3% 7.3% 40.9% 60.7% 58.5% 32.2%
High Education 6.2% 29.2% 56.4% 57.7% 37.3% 13.2%
Advanced Age Survival
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
Low Education 54.2% 42.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Medium Education 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
High Education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 3.23: Pension achievement with the fourth policy experiment: age of 67 as full
pension requirement.
Low Education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65/67) 24.8 27.2
Years of formality (at 70/72) 27.3 28.9
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 18 19
p0.125 22 24
p0.25 25 27
p0.5 29 30
p0.75 30 31
p0.875 31 33
p0.975 34 37
Medium education
Benchmark Policy
Years of formality (at 65/67) 34.0 35.0
Years of formality (at 70/72) 34.1 35.0
Distribution at age 70
p0.025 29 31
p0.125 31 32
p0.25 32 34
p0.5 34 36
p0.75 36 38
p0.875 37 39
p0.975 39 41
Table 3.24: Formality with the fourth policy experiment: age of 67 as full pension require-
ment.
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3.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I simulate a discrete choice model where the workers choose between
working in the formal or in the informal sector. These choices depend on the wages that
are paid in each sector (by education and experience), and the benefits that the workers
can enjoy in retirement age. The model replicates the existence of a large share of informal
salaried workers, especially in the lower side of the distribution where the low educated
workers account for the majority.
The Argentinean pension system is considered strict in term of requirements in order
to be covered at retirement age, which is a more significant problem for the low educated
workers. However, the requirements to have the right to an Advanced age pension are
not so strict for a salaried worker (only 10 years) and, both in my estimations and in the
literature, all workers at least achieve this pension22.
The model estimation captures the informality in all the educative levels and also the
transitions among the formality, informality and unemployment. Pension achievements are
in line with other estimations in the literature, showing that among the salaried workers
the main problem is with the low educated ones.
The policy experiments show that workers decide to work less in formality when the
compulsory career is shorter and replacement rates are lower (PAYG scheme), even if they
achieve a lower pension income. When the requirements became stricter, they work more
in formality, especially those workers who are closer to the new thresholds. It is remarkable
that when the first step of full pension requirement is less strict, they work less formally,
even those who are at the top of the distribution. The main changes in the behavior occur
in the last part of the career, that is after the age of 45.
22Note, that this special pension was designed mainly for women and self employed workers.
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3.9 Appendix
Figure E.1: Argentinean population pyramid 1995, 1975, 2000 and 2015.
Source: CELADE.
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(a) From formal
(b) From informal
Figure E.2: Transition from formality (informality) to the other states.
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(a) From unemployment
(b) Stayer
Figure E.3: Transition from unemployment to the other states and those who remain in
the same state.
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Age group: 23-28 years old
Unemployed Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3805 0.0597 0.1079
Medium Education 0.3741 0.0371 0.1094
High Education 0.3889 0.0329 0.1416
Formal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.1531 0.7707 0.1402
Medium Education 0.2291 0.8636 0.2276
High Education 0.3220 0.9086 0.3241
Informal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.4664 0.1695 0.7519
Medium Education 0.3969 0.0993 0.6630
High Education 0.2891 0.0584 0.534
Age group: 29-34 years old
Unemployed Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3726 0.0413 0.0941
Medium Education 0.3533 0.0247 0.1021
High Education 0.3255 0.0151 0.1010
Formal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.1781 0.8215 0.1733
Medium Education 0.2723 0.8992 0.2671
High Education 0.3902 0.9435 0.4046
Informal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.4493 0.1372 0.7326
Medium Education 0.3744 0.0762 0.6308
High Education 0.2843 0.0415 0.4944
Age group: 35-44 years old
Unemployed Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3736 0.0356 0.1039
Medium Education 0.3480 0.0199 0.1043
High Education 0.2972 0.0104 0.0977
Formal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.2003 0.8471 0.1888
Medium Education 0.3055 0.9171 0.3058
High Education 0.4405 0.9560 0.4438
Informal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.4262 0.1173 0.7073
Medium Education 0.3466 0.0630 0.5899
High Education 0.2623 0.0336 0.4585
Table E.1: Probabilities of being in each sector (only men) based on the multinomial
model.
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Age group: 45-54 years old
Unemployed Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3829 0.0330 0.1143
Medium Education 0.3352 0.0179 0.1152
High Education 0.2999 0.0094 0.0936
Formal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.2220 0.8654 0.2072
Medium Education 0.3450 0.9275 0.3289
High Education 0.4725 0.9616 0.4876
Informal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3951 0.1016 0.6786
Medium Education 0.3198 0.0546 0.5559
High Education 0.2277 0.0291 0.4188
Age group: 55-65 years old
Unemployed Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.4235 0.0379 0.1351
Medium Education 0.3568 0.0209 0.1395
High Education 0.2624 0.0092 0.0864
Formal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.2245 0.8688 0.2226
Medium Education 0.3605 0.9290 0.3437
High Education 0.5372 0.9654 0.5351
Informal Unemployed (-1) Formal (-1) Informal (-1)
Low Education 0.3520 0.0933 0.6423
Medium Education 0.2828 0.0501 0.5168
High Education 0.2003 0.0253 0.3785
Table E.2: Probabilities of being in each sector (only men) based on the multinomial
model.
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Low Education Medium Education High Education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
23-
28
0.1462 0.0862 0.0830 0.1039 0.0808 0.0661
[0.1298, 0.1703] [0.0694, 0.0966] [0.0464, 0.1147]
29-
34
0.0845 0.0362 0.0527 0.0326 0.0172 0.0056
[0.0710, 0.0968] [0.0384, 0.0675] [0.0090, 0.0429]
35-
44
0.0729 0.0342 0.0311 0.0032 0.0126 0.0034
[0.0618, 0.0861] [0.0232, 0.0458] [0.0076, 0.0222]
45-
54
0.1053 0.1091 0.0220 0.0031 0.0161 0.0355
[0.0696, 0.1551] [0.0152, 0.0354] [0.0108, 0.0227]
55+ 0.0862 0.0970 0.1044 0.0925 0.0096 0.0307
[0.0624, 0.1122] [0.0514, 0.1687] [0.0047, 0.0174]
Table E.3: Moment matching: Unemployed workers. The interval is estimated based on
the multinomial model, performing bootstraps and considering the middle 90%.
General Low Education Medium Education High Education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
23-28 0.399 0.398 0.265 0.264 0.481 0.480 0.615 0.612
29-34 0.619 0.622 0.512 0.513 0.692 0.697 0.778 0.780
35-44 0.756 0.746 0.651 0.628 0.852 0.851 0.854 0.857
45-54 0.747 0.757 0.544 0.550 0.943 0.955 0.904 0.924
55+ 0.831 0.891 0.764 0.838 0.875 0.937 0.933 0.949
Table E.4: Formality path with the second policy experiment: 35 years of formality as full
pension requirement and 20 years in formality as Advance age pension requirement.
General Low Education Medium Education High Education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
23-28 0.399 0.398 0.265 0.264 0.481 0.484 0.615 0.619
29-34 0.619 0.620 0.512 0.513 0.692 0.694 0.778 0.780
35-44 0.756 0.758 0.651 0.628 0.852 0.853 0.854 0.854
45-54 0.747 0.720 0.544 0.544 0.943 0.894 0.904 0.848
55+ 0.831 0.807 0.764 0.743 0.875 0.839 0.933 0.922
Table E.5: Formality path with the third policy experiment: 25 years of formality as full
pension requirement.
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General Low Education Medium Education High Education
Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy Benchmark Policy
23-28 0.399 0.402 0.265 0.279 0.481 0.484 0.615 0.606
29-34 0.619 0.624 0.512 0.513 0.692 0.699 0.778 0.785
35-44 0.756 0.753 0.651 0.647 0.852 0.849 0.854 0.854
45-54 0.747 0.749 0.544 0.533 0.943 0.948 0.904 0.939
55+ 0.831 0.889 0.764 0.854 0.875 0.906 0.933 0.955
Table E.6: Formality path with the fourth policy experiment: age of 67 as full pension
requirement.
Transitions
Benchmark 1st Policy 2nd Policy 3rd Policy 4th Policy
Informal-Formal 0.476 0.485 0.484 0.465 0.474
Informal-Unemployed 0.123 0.113 0.100 0.138 0.122
Informal-Informal 0.401 0.402 0.416 0.397 0.404
Formal-Formal 0.835 0.795 0.85 0.825 0.853
Formal-Unemployed 0.027 0.036 0.014 0.033 0.019
Formal-Informal 0.139 0.166 0.136 0.142 0.129
Unemployed-Formal 0.259 0.347 0.224 0.349 0.234
Unemployed-Unemployed 0.323 0.218 0.223 0.292 0.292
Unemployed-Informal 0.418 0.435 0.553 0.359 0.475
Table E.7: Transitions with the policy experiments.
132
Bibliography
Alexander, K., Entwisle, D., and Kabbani, N. (2001). The dropout process in life course
perspective: Early risk factors at home and school. Teachers College Record, 103:760–
823.
Alm, J., Jackson, B. R., and McKee, M. (2009). Getting the word out: Enforcement
information dissemination and compliance behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 93(3-
4):392–402.
Amaral, P. S. and Quintin, E. (2006). A competitive model of the informal sector. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 53(7):1541–1553.
Arza, C. (2009). Back to the state: Pension fund nationalization in argentina. Technical
Report DT 73, Centro Interdisciplinario para el Estudio de Pol´ıticas Pu´blicas.
Attanasio, O., Meghir, C., and Santiago, A. (2010). Education choices in mexico: using
a structural model and a randomized experiment to evaluate progresa. IFS Working
Papers W10/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Bailey Jones, J. and French, E. (2010). The e↵ects of health insurance and self-insurance
on retirement behavior. Technical report, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of
Economics.
Bertranou, F. (2001). Cobertura Previsional en Argentina, Brasil y Chile. Oficina Inter-
nacional del Trabajo.
Boca, D. D., Monfardini, C., and Nicoletti, C. (2012). Children’s and parents’ time-
use choices and cognitive development during adolescence. Working Papers 2012-006,
Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
Bosch, M. and Guajardo, J. (2012). Labor market impacts of non-contributory pensions:
The case of argentina’s moratorium. IDB Publications 78158, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank.
Bosch, M. and Manacorda, M. (2012). Social policies and labor market outcomes in
latin america and the caribbean: A review of the existing evidence. CEP Occasional
Papers 32, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
133
Bibliography
Botero Garc´ıa, J. (2010). El impacto de las restricciones a las exportaciones colombianas a
venezuela. CIRJE F-Series 10-04, Centro de Investigaciones Econo´micas y Financieras.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P., and Weiss, Y. (2014). Economics of the Family. Cambridge
Surveys of Economic Literature. Cambridge University Press.
Bucheli, M. and Ceni, R. (2010). Informality sectoral selection and earnings in uruguay.
Estudios Econo´micos, 25(2):281–307.
Cappellari, L., Dell’Aringa, C., and Leonardi, M. (2011). Temporary employment, job
flows and productivity: A tale of two reforms. Working paper series.
Christle, C., Jolivette, K., and Nelson, C. (2002). The high school journal. Remedial and
Special Education, 85(4):325–339.
Dolado, J. J., Garca-Serrano, C., and Jimeno, J. F. (2001). Drawing lessons from the
boom of temporary jobs in spain. Working Papers 2001-11, FEDEA.
Eckstein, Z. and Wolpin, K. I. (1999). Why youths drop out of high school: The impact
of preferences, opportunities, and abilities. Econometrica, 67(6):1295–1340.
Fields, G. S. (2011). Labor market policy in developing countries : a selective review of
the literature and needs for the future. Labour Economics, 18.
Finn, J. (1989). Withdrawing from school. Review of Educational Research, 59(2):117–142.
Forteza, A., Apella, I., Fajnzylber, E., Grushka, C., Rossi, I., and Sanroman, G. (2009).
Work histories and pension entitlements in argentina, chile and uruguay. Social Protec-
tion Discussion Papers 52446, The World Bank.
Forteza, A. and Ourens, G. (2009). How much do latinamerican promise to pay back?
Technical Report 31/09, dECON.
Friedman, E., Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (2000). Dodging the
grabbing hand: the determinants of uno cial activity in 69 countries. Journal of Public
Economics, 76(3):459–493.
Galiani, S. and Weinschelbaum, F. (2007). Modeling informality formally: Households and
firms. CEDLAS, Working Papers 0047, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
134
Bibliography
Giuliodori, D. and Stucchi, R. (2010). Innovation and job creation in a dual labor market:
evidence from spain. MPRA Paper 23006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Gri n, B. (2002). Academic disidentification, race, and high school dropouts. High School
Journal, 85(4):71–81.
Hazans, M. (2011). Informal workers across europe: Evidence from 30 countries. IZA
Discussion Papers 5871, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Holzmann, R; Robalino, D. and Takayama, N. e. (2009). Closing the Coverage Gap: The
Role of Social Pensions and Other Retirement Income Transfers. World Bank, robert
holzmann, david a. robalino, noriyuki takayama edition.
Ihrig, J. and Moe, K. S. (2004). Lurking in the shadows: the informal sector and govern-
ment policy. Journal of Development Economics, 73(2):541–557.
ILO (2013). Trabajo decente y juventud en ame´rica latina. 2013. World bank other
operational studies, Oficina Regional para Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1998). Regulatory discretion and the
uno cial economy. American Economic Review, 88(2):387–92.
Joubert, C. (2012). Pension design with a large informal labor market: Evidence from
chile. Technical report, UPenn.
Kaufmann, K. M., Ferrara, E. L., and Brollo, F. (2012). Learning about the enforcement
of conditional welfare programs: Evidence from the bolsa familia program in brazil.
Technical report, Department of Economics, Bocconi University.
Keane, M. P. and Wolpin, K. I. (1997). The career decisions of young men. Journal of
Political Economy, 105:473–522.
Kmenta, J. (1967). On estimation of the ces production function. International Economic
Review, 8:180–189.
Labat, J. P. (2012). La perspectiva del mides en investigacio´n y pol´ıticas sociales. La
colaboracio´n entre la udelar y el mides para la implementacio´n del panes, CSIC-UdelaR.
135
Bibliography
Li, Y. and Mumford, K. (2009). Aspirations, expectations and education outcomes for
children in britain: Considering relative measures of family e ciency. Discussion Papers
09/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
Loayza, N. V. and Rigolini, J. (2011). Informal employment: Safety net or growth engine?
World Development, 39(9):1503–1515.
Loayza, N. V., Serven, L., and Sugawara, N. (2009). Informality in latin america and the
caribbean. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4888, The World Bank.
Magnac, T. (1991). Segmented or competitive labor markets. Econometrica, 59(1):165–87.
Maloney, W. F. (2004). Informality revisited. World Development, 32(7):1159–1178.
Otero, A. (2013). Informality and pension incentives: A structural household life cycle
model of consumption, labor supply and pension savings. Technical report, UCL.
Portes, A., Castells, M., Benton, L., and Portes, A. (1989). The Informal economy : studies
in advanced and less developed countries. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, castells, m. and benton, l. (eds.) edition.
Pratap, S. and Quintin, E. (2006). Are labor markets segmented in developing countries?
a semiparametric approach. European Economic Review, 50(7):1817–1841.
Rincke, J. and Traxler, C. (2011). Enforcement Spillovers. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 93(4):1224–1234.
Robalino, D.and Zylbertajn, H. (2009). Ex-ante methods to assess the impact of social
insurance policies on labor supply with an application to brazil. Technical report, World
Bank.
Rofman, R. (2000). The pension system in argentina six years after the reform. Technical
report, World Bank.
Rofman, R., E., F., and Herrera, G. (2010). Reformando las reformas previsionales: en la
argentina y chile. Revista CEPAL, 101:85–109.
Schneider, F. (2012). The shadow economy and work in the shadow: What do we (not)
know? IZA Discussion Papers 6423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
136
Bibliography
Stinebrickner, T. and Stinebrickner, R. (2013). Academic performance and college
dropout: Using longitudinal expectations data to estimate a learning model. Work-
ing Paper 18945, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Todd, P. and Velez-Grajales, V. (2008). How pension rules a↵ect work and contribution
patterns: a behavioral model of the chilean privitized pension system. Technical report,
University of Michigan. Retirement Research Center.
Todd, P. E. and Wolpin, K. I. (2006). Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program
in mexico: Using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child
schooling and fertility. American Economic Review, 96(5):1384–1417.
Ulyssea, G. (2010). Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector.
Journal of Development Economics, 91(1):87–99.
UM/CIEA (2013). Educacio´n en uruguay y ame´rica latina. Bolet´ın estad´ıstico, Centro de
Investigaciones en Economı´a Aplicada, Universidad de Montevideo.
United-Nations (1999). World population aging 1950-2050. Technical report, United
Nations, New York, NY. Dept. of Economic and Social A↵airs.
Van der Klaauw, W. and Wolpin, K. I. (2008). Social security and the retirement and
savings behavior of low-income households. Journal of Econometrics, 145:21–42.
World-Bank (2010). Informality in colombia : Implications for worker welfare and firm
productivity. World Bank Other Operational Studies 2889, The World Bank.
137
